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87th Congress, 1st Session

House Report No. 1249

NEW CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

NINTH REPORT

BY THE

**COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS**



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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., September 20, 1961.

Hon. SAM RAYBURN,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: By direction of the Committee on Government Operations, I submit herewith the committee's ninth report to the 87th Congress. The committee's report is based on a study made by its Military Operations Subcommittee.

WILLIAM L. DAWSON, Chairman.

III

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A WARNING NOTE

(By the Committee on Government Operations,
U.S. House of Representatives)

The upsurge of public interest in civil defense is noted at the outset of this report.

Members of the Congress and of the civil defense agencies—Federal, State, and local—are receiving large numbers of inquiries and requests for information on fallout shelters and other civil defense matters.

We trust that these inquiries will be answered promptly with authoritative information, and we urge the civil defense authorities to establish the necessary facilities for quick and accurate response.

The Committee sounds a warning note to the American people.

Avoid fly-by-night operators with shelter-building schemes and would-be sellers of expensive or useless gadgets and devices under the label of civil defense.

Be wary of false advertising of merchandise or services, including insurance policies, which are offered as civil defense protection.

Do not sign a contract for construction of a home shelter until you have consulted civil defense officials in your city, or other government unit, and have received reliable information on requirements and cost estimates.

Be sure that what you buy for individual or family civil defense needs is really essential and meets the necessary standards of performance.

C O N T E N T S

	Page
Introduction	1
Investigations and hearings	2
Hearing objectives	3
Principal witnesses	3
I. The President's message	4
Civil defense as insurance	4
Fallout shelter program	4
Preparatory reorganizations	5
Executive leadership	5
Some critical observations	6
Blast vs. fallout shelters	7
Analysis of deterrence	7
Strategic role of civil defense	8
"Invulnerability" a relative term	8
Background of reorganization	9
Problems to be solved	10
II. Approaches to reorganization	11
Civil defense by delegation	11
Early delegation concept	12
Dual program of delegations	12
Merger of functions	13
Expanded delegations proposed	13
Emergency preparedness orders	14
New Director's approach	15
Proposed civil defense assignments	15
Department of Defense views	16
Four organizational options	17
Assistant Secretary for Civil Defense?	17
Joint Chiefs' control?	17
Military department control?	18
Civil Defense Administrator?	18
Problems of field organization	18
McKinsey analysis of alternatives	19
Partial shelter assignment to defense?	20
Shelter and related functions?	20
Full civil defense assignment?	21
Problems posed by alternatives	21
Alternatives for internal defense organization	22
Civil Defense Administrator?	22
Military department control?	22
Assistant Secretary to coordinate?	23
McKinsey on OEP's role	23
Mr. Ellis' final recommendations	24
Promulgation of Executive order	25
III. Executive Order 10952	27
Earlier developments	27
DOD civil defense role: 1961	28
Organizational base for civil defense	29
New kinds of coordination	30
Secretary's commanding position	31
OEP civil defense role: 1961	31
Reserved civil defense functions	32
OEP's advisory status	33
Presidential delegations	33
Problems of the transition	34
Outlook for OEP	35
List of witnesses	79
Additional views of Hon. Clare E. Hoffman	80
Additional views of Hon. Clare E. Hoffman, Hon. George Meader, Hon. Clarence J. Brown, and Hon. John B. Anderson	81

CONTENTS

	Page
IV. Evolution of a national shelter policy.....	37
Lessons of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.....	37
Planning for the future.....	37
"Nominal" bomb shelters.....	38
Legislative authorizations.....	39
Shelter survey program: 1951-52.....	40
Evaluation by Project East River.....	41
Continued shelter surveys: 1953.....	42
Shift to evacuation planning: 1954.....	42
Proposed shelter program: 1956.....	43
National shelter policy: 1958.....	44
Prototype shelters.....	45
Shelters in existing Federal buildings.....	45
Shelters for new Federal buildings.....	45
Pilot survey program.....	46
V. The new shelter program.....	47
Budget estimates.....	47
The shelter survey program: 1961-62.....	48
Training program.....	49
Contract management.....	49
Test surveys.....	49
Stocking the shelter spaces.....	50
Rations and supplies.....	50
Food reserves.....	50
Processed food.....	51
Provisioning problem.....	51
Improvements in existing shelter spaces.....	52
Shelters in new Federal buildings.....	52
Shelter-related measures.....	53
Attack warning.....	53
Home warning system.....	53
Other measures.....	54
Research and development.....	54
Lifesaving potentials of new program.....	54
Loose arithmetic.....	55
Better-than-random shelters.....	55
Shelter location.....	56
VI. Civil defense: 1961-65.....	57
The immediate future.....	57
Forward planning.....	58
An optimum shelter plan.....	58
Blast protection aspects.....	59
Blast shelters vs. active defense.....	60
Missile sites and fallout hazards.....	60
Use of military resources and reserves.....	62
Army planning.....	62
Department of Defense policy: 1956.....	62
Department of Defense policy: 1960.....	63
Precommitment problem.....	63
Availability of standby and retired reserves.....	63
Research and information programs.....	64
VII. Basic attitudes toward civil defense.....	66
Two justifications.....	66
Attitudes of rejection.....	67
The futility school.....	68
The "too effective" argument.....	68
Possible Soviet reactions.....	69
VIII. Soviet civil defense.....	71
No outward signs.....	71
An expanding program.....	72
Organization and budget.....	73
Training programs.....	74
Individual means of protection.....	74
Reducing urban vulnerability.....	75
Soviet shelter programs.....	75
Evacuation plans.....	77
Other measures.....	77

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87TH CONGRESS } HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES { REPORT
1st Session } No. 1249

NEW CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM

SEPTEMBER 21, 1961.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed

Mr. Dawson, from the Committee on Government Operations,
submitted the following

NINTH REPORT

BASED ON A STUDY BY THE MILITARY OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE

On September 19, 1961, the Committee on Government Operations had before it for consideration a report entitled "New Civil Defense Program." Upon motion made and seconded, the report was approved and adopted as the report of the full committee. The chairman was directed to transmit a copy to the Speaker of the House.

INTRODUCTION

The course of civil defense in the United States has taken a dramatic new turn within the past few months. Since May 1961 these events have occurred:

(1) The President personally has addressed the Congress and the American people on the vital importance of civil defense as national "insurance."

(2) The Department of Defense has been made responsible for carrying out major civil defense functions, including shelter protection, vested in the President by law and policy.

(3) The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization is being reconstituted as the Office of Emergency Planning to assist and advise the President in exercising his civil defense and mobilization planning responsibilities.

(4) The Congress, responding to the President's call for a stepped-up civil defense program, has appropriated funds for shelter and other civil defense purposes four times as great as those appropriated in fiscal year 1960.

(5) Civil defense authorities in the Department of Defense have taken the first steps in a national program to identify, mark, improve, and equip existing structures in the United States for shelter against fallout hazards.

(6) Among the citizenry there has been a quick upsurge of interest in civil defense which appears to be more substantial and enduring than at any time in the past.

In sum, America is "coming of age" in the thermonuclear age. These important developments—and they are only a beginning—vindicate this committee's unremitting and sometimes lone endeavors within the past 6 years to bring about an effective civil defense for the United States.

INVESTIGATIONS AND HEARINGS

Broad-scale investigations in this field by the Military Operations Subcommittee commenced in 1955. Our first basic report was issued in 1956. Including the hearings held this year and the present report, altogether this committee has held hearings in 5 separate years and has issued seven separate reports on civil defense.¹

Early in May the subcommittee decided to schedule civil defense hearings during this session of the Congress. The executive departments and agencies concerned were duly notified. The President's office pledged cooperation on the part of the executive branch. The subcommittee, in turn, adjusted its hearing schedule to accommodate executive branch officials busily engaged in reexamining the civil defense program and drafting new Executive orders, memoranda, and instructions.

In their preparatory work, a number of these officials conferred frequently with the subcommittee chairman and staff and drew heavily upon the documentary materials and voluminous information amassed by the subcommittee in 6 years of investigations. We believe that our work in the civil defense field has contributed to a fuller and better understanding of the Government's responsibilities for civil defense; also, that our work has been influential in the President's decision to support a renewed and expanded civil defense effort. In the future the subcommittee intends, as Chairman Holifield stated at the recent hearings, "to maintain a friendly and sympathetic but critical eye on civil defense."

¹ Prior committee reports in chronological sequence are as follows (those marked with an asterisk are no longer available for distribution from the committee):
"Civil Defense for National Survival," H. Rept. No. 2946, 84th Cong., 2d sess., submitted July 27, 1956.*
"Status of Civil Defense Legislation," H. Rept. No. 829, 85th Cong., 1st sess., submitted July 22, 1957.*
"Analysis of Civil Defense Reorganization" (Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958), H. Rept. No. 1874, 85th Cong., 2d sess., submitted June 12, 1958.*
"Atomic Shelter Programs," H. Rept. No. 2554, 85th Cong., 2d sess., submitted August 12, 1958.*
"Civil Defense in Western Europe and the Soviet Union," H. Rept. No. 300, 86th Cong., 1st sess., submitted April 27, 1959.*
"Civil Defense Shelter Policy and Postattack Recovery Planning," H. Rept. No. 2069, 86th Cong., 2d sess., submitted July 1, 1960.

HEARING OBJECTIVES

Hearings were held by the Military Operations Subcommittee on August 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9, 1961.² In opening the hearings, subcommittee Chairman Holifield announced that they would serve the following broad purposes:

- (1) To understand more fully the new civil defense program promulgated by President Kennedy;
- (2) To update technical findings of importance and interest to civil defense;
- (3) To take a forward look at the shape of the civil defense program 5 years hence; and,
- (4) To take a backward look at what, if anything, civil defense has accomplished to date, so that pitfalls and errors of the past may be avoided.

PRINCIPAL WITNESSES

The principal witnesses were Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, and Frank B. Ellis, Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, with supporting testimony from their staffs.

Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appeared with Secretary McNamara and presented a separate statement on the importance of an effective civil defense program.

Other witnesses from the Atomic Energy Commission and the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory presented technical information on nuclear weapons effects and experimental shelter operations.

A special panel of civil defense experts, headed by Herman Kahn, presented testimony on a wide range of civil defense matters including the following:

- (1) The strategic role of civil defense;
- (2) Consequences of different levels of hypothetical nuclear attack;
- (3) Recuperation and recovery after nuclear attack;
- (4) Problems relating to fires and fire storms caused by nuclear explosions;
- (5) Ecological effects of thermonuclear war; and,
- (6) Recent developments in Soviet civil defense.

The expert witnesses testified in their individual capacities and not as representatives of Government or other agencies or organizations. A complete list of witnesses is appended to the report. (See p. 79.)

²These hearings are cited in the report as "1961 hearings."

I. THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE

On May 25, 1961, President Kennedy presented personally to the Congress a "Special message on urgent national needs."⁸ A section of that message was devoted to civil defense. The President said that civil defense was a major element of national security "never squarely faced up to" by the Nation. He said that while various programs had been considered from time to time over a decade, no consistent policy had been adopted, and "apathy, indifference, and skepticism" prevailed. One of the reasons for this attitude, the President suggested, was that some of the civil defense plans had been too "far reaching or unrealistic."

Next, the President stated that the administration had been taking a "hard" look at civil defense to determine its possibilities and limitations. He made these points on the negative side:

It cannot be obtained cheaply. It cannot give an assurance of blast protection that will be proof against surprise attack or guaranteed against obsolescence or destruction. And it cannot deter a nuclear attack.

CIVIL DEFENSE AS INSURANCE

Expanding on the role of deterrence, the President said that only a retaliatory power sufficiently strong and invulnerable to convince the aggressor that he would be destroyed would deter him from making a nuclear attack.

If we have that strength, civil defense is not needed to deter an attack. If we should ever lack it, civil defense would not be an adequate substitute.

For deterrence to be effective, the President reasoned, men must be moved by "rational calculations." We cannot be sure that men will always act rationally. Deterrence would not guarantee against "an irrational attack, a miscalculation, an accidental war," and these possibilities are heightened by modern warfare. It is here that civil defense comes into play—as a kind of national insurance policy against miscalculation.

It is insurance we trust will never be needed—but insurance which we could never forgive ourselves for foregoing in the event of catastrophe.

FALLOUT SHELTER PROGRAM

The President went on to say that once the insurance concept is recognized, we should do something about civil defense without delay. He proposed a fallout shelter program which should: (1) be nation-

⁸ H. Doc. 174, 87th Cong., 1st sess. The portion of the address pertaining to civil defense is reprinted in the 1961 hearings as app. 1A, p. 375.

wide; (2) be long range; (3) identify existing fallout shelter capacity; and (4) provide shelter in new and existing structures. Such shelter against fallout hazards "would protect millions of people" if the enemy launched a large-scale nuclear attack.

The President explained that effective use of the shelters would require such additional measures as warning, training, radiological monitoring, and stockpiling of foods and medicines. He concluded the reference to fallout shelters with a statement that—

effective performance of the entire program requires not only new legislative authority and more funds, but also sound organizational arrangements.

PREPARATORY REORGANIZATIONS

Thereupon the President announced that the following preparatory steps would be taken:

(1) Responsibility for "this program" would be assigned to the Secretary of Defense, who is already responsible for continental defense in the United States. Responsibilities for related preparedness programs in health, food, manpower, transportation, and other needs would be assigned to appropriate Federal departments and agencies, which would work cooperatively with State and local agencies.

(2) The Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization would be reconstituted as a small staff agency to assist the President in coordinating assigned functions. The agency henceforth would be called the Office of Emergency Planning.⁴

(3) New authorization and appropriation requests would be transmitted to the Congress in the interest of "a much strengthened Federal-State civil defense program." The authority and funds would go for these purposes: (a) Identifying fallout shelter capacity in existing structures; (b) incorporating shelter, where appropriate, in Federal buildings; (c) new requirements for shelter in buildings constructed with Federal financial assistance; and (d) matching grants and other incentives for constructing shelter in State and local public and private buildings.⁵

Civil defense appropriations for fiscal 1962, the President estimated, would "more than triple the pending budget requests; and they will increase sharply in subsequent years." He foresaw that financial participation also would be required by State and local governments and private citizens.

EXECUTIVE LEADERSHIP

We find it heartening and fortunate that the President recognizes the vital importance of an effective civil defense. His personal messages to the Congress and to the American people have banished, almost overnight, a great deal of public apathy and indifference. We have always believed that if the President, as the Chief Executive and

⁴ Legislation to effect the name change was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives as H.R. 8406. It passed the House Aug. 21, 1961, and the Senate on Sept. 7, 1961.

⁵ The civil defense funds were included in the President's request of July 26, 1961, to the Congress for increased military appropriations. S. Doc. 39, 87th Cong., 1st sess.

the Commander in Chief, would speak out clearly on the subject and show that the Federal Government itself takes civil defense seriously; the people also would be convinced. They would be more willing to help themselves and support the national effort. Public apathy, in the final analysis, is merely a reflection of official apathy.

As far as civil defense is concerned, this kind of executive leadership is welcome. And yet, we should not regard it as a fortuitous event or happy circumstance that the Chief Executive endorses a strong civil defense program. By law and policy the responsibility for civil defense now is vested in the President of the United States.⁶ In faithfully executing the laws, the President can do no less than order effective civil defense measures, and if the laws need changing, then the President has a constitutional obligation to so advise the Congress.

SOME CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS

The committee makes certain critical observations about the President's civil defense message of May 25, not in a carping spirit but against the background of extensive studies and analyses of Government operations in the civil defense field. We want to be sure that the problems are fully understood and the basic concepts are sound, so that the substantial resources in manpower, material, and money to be devoted to civil defense tasks will be effectively used.

First of all, we agree that civil defense cannot be cheaply bought. We believe, and we have stressed in our reports, that an effective civil defense program, including a nationwide system of shelter protection, is well within our national means. We have the resources, the technology, and the know-how to make prompt, large strides forward. As the President said, no insurance is cost-free, and civil defense as national insurance will require substantial outlays.

Of course, we agree that "far-reaching or unrealistic" programs should be avoided. We do not believe, however, that once the American people become sufficiently informed about nuclear weapon hazards and civil defense needs, they will settle for very limited insurance coverage and the bare minimum of protection. We look upon the civil defense program announced to date as a beginning, and we assume that it is but a first step in a well-organized, progressively developing civil defense program. Our first basic report on this subject in 1956 called for a comprehensive program of nationwide scope and pointed out that the costs are not unrealistic in proportion to total annual outlays for national defense.

Our 1956 report emphasized that shelter protection is a key measure in civil defense.⁷ Without shelter protection, other measures would be largely ineffective. Civil defense officials for many years had failed to grasp or admit that central fact. The instrumental role of shelters in civil defense now is coming to be recognized. But "shelter" is a word of many meanings, and planners must decide what kinds and levels of shelter protection will be sought.

⁶ Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958, effective July 1, 1958 (23 F.R. 4491; 72 Stat. 1799; 50 U.S.C. App. 2271).

⁷ H. Rept. 2946, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 20.

BLAST VERSUS FALLOUT SHELTERS

A distinction commonly is made in civil defense literature between blast and fallout shelters. The President's program, as announced to date, mentions only fallout shelters. The committee cautions that this distinction should not be taken too literally since there is an overlap in protective value of shelters. An adequate fallout shelter provides some blast protection, and any blast shelter provides fallout protection.

The committee understands the reluctance of Government officials to dwell on blast protection. Given the enormous explosive power of megaton-range weapons, blast protection conjures up an image of cities going underground, with deep excavations and tunneling at staggering costs in hundred-billion-dollar magnitudes. This may account for the President's qualifying remarks on blast shelters.

The President did not mention publicly the cost factors in blast protection. Rather he cited the inability of civil defense to offer guarantees that blast shelters would be useful against surprise attack or withstand destruction or obsolescence. There are, of course, no absolute guarantees in civil defense, and none ought to be demanded. It is a real and serious problem, however, to determine whether and how much blast protection is required, and at what shelter locations.

We choose not to construe the President's remarks as completely writing off blast shelters. A well-planned, long-range civil defense program, in our view, calls for elements of blast protection. The problem demands careful analysis, and we consider it again in this report (sec. VI).

ANALYSIS OF DETERRENCE

In presenting his case for civil defense, the President argued in essence: (1) That our retaliatory striking power, not civil defense, will deter a nuclear attack; but (2) since mistakes or madness may characterize the enemy's behavior, deterrence may fail; and therefore (3) civil defense is our last resort against catastrophe. We realize, of course, that in the brief compass of his civil defense message to the Congress, the President could not do justice to the involved and subtle dialectic of deterrence. In our belief, however, the President's case for civil defense was put on too narrow a base of justification; it sounded as if civil defense were designed solely for the exceptional or most unlikely situation.

Granted, first of all, that "civil defense cannot deter a nuclear attack." So far as we know, no one ever has contended that civil defense by itself would deter an attack. But many informed persons have contended, and our reports repeatedly have said, that civil defense is an integral part of the national defense and is an essential part of the deterrent strength and posture of the Nation.

The President, we believe, subscribes to that position, as shown by his remarks in full context and his strong endorsement of an improved civil defense program. The particular formulation in his message seems to reflect a lingering concern that undue emphasis on civil defense might divert resources and effort from the continued buildup

of retaliatory power. The problem of allocating resources for optimum defense yield is always with us, but so far civil defense has not gained a sufficient share.

There are diehard advocates of striking power as the exclusive deterrent. They scoff at civil defense and oppose any investment of funds for civil defense. If they take comfort from the President's statement that civil defense is not "an adequate substitute" for retaliatory power, we rejoin that the reverse proposition also is true. Our offensive capability is no adequate substitute for civil defense measures to protect the American people. The primacy of retaliatory striking power as a deterrent is not questioned; merely its exclusiveness.

STRATEGIC ROLE OF CIVIL DEFENSE

Rather than juxtapose deterrence and civil defense in terms of substitutes or alternatives, the President could have presented civil defense as a strategic component of deterrence. Indeed, General Lemnitzer, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated to the subcommittee that civil defense is a part—though not the major part—of our deterrent strength. He explained the President's remarks to the same effect.⁸

As a factor in deterrent strength, civil defense helps to minimize nuclear blackmail possibilities and lends more credibility to our promise to counter an attack on NATO allies. There are many potential war situations short of sudden and all-out nuclear attack in which the factor of civilian protection must be considered and calculated both by the aggressor and by those who resist aggression.

If our retaliatory striking power were sufficiently strong and invulnerable, the President suggested, civil defense would not be needed to deter an attack. But strength and invulnerability are not absolutes, any more than civil defense offers an absolute guarantee of protection. In fact, there are different kinds and degrees of vulnerability and no system ever is complete or perfect.

"INVULNERABILITY" A RELATIVE TERM

The Polaris submarine system, for example, may be considered less vulnerable than missiles on fixed sites within the United States. We know of no pending plans, however, to junk our Atlas, Titan, and Minuteman programs. As we build more missiles and "harder" sites to reduce vulnerability, the enemy must earmark bigger nuclear payloads for each target and contemplate a larger total attack. This increases the potential fallout and other hazards for the civilian population. In this sense, growing invulnerability and retaliatory striking power increase, rather than decrease, the need for civil defense.

Invulnerability also depends on what the enemy does for the protection of his own people. If the would-be aggressor has a much higher degree of civil defense protection than we do, including planned sheltering and evacuation of his civil population in advance of a decision to attack, then the damage he can inflict on us could be far greater

* 1961 hearings, pp. 14, 21, 22.

than that which we can inflict in retaliation. In this case we might not scare the enemy enough to deter his attack. His civil defense, and our lack of it, could well cast the balance in his favor.

This is another way of saying that civil defense adds to our deterrent strength; it is something more than insurance against the enemy's mistakes or madness. The dangers of war in the modern world caused by accident or error or irrational behavior are real, but they are overstated. The biggest danger is aggression and war by plan, by deliberate calculation of a ruthless opponent with a design for ultimate world conquest. Civil defense works against the enemy's plans and makes less likely their execution. Civil defense works also for our national survival if the enemy should attack.

BACKGROUND OF REORGANIZATIONS

We come now to the President's announcement in his May 25 message that certain civil defense responsibilities would be transferred to the Department of Defense and that the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization would be reconstituted as the Office of Emergency Planning. These actions would mark a full turn of the wheel in two cycles of Government operations: One is the return to the Defense Department of civil defense planning functions which had reposed there in earlier years; the other is the revesting in two separate agencies of civil defense and resource mobilization planning functions which had been consolidated in the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization in 1958.

A motivating factor in the President's decision, we may properly assume, was realization of the low status, meager financial support, and limited accomplishments of OCDM and its predecessor agencies in a decade of operation. The 1958 reorganization plan gave the civil defense agency a high place—in the Executive Office of the President—but it still ranked low in official and public esteem. There were many able, experienced, and dedicated public servants in OCDM, but they had suffered through long years of the civil defense drought. Frustrated, timid, unable to break through the crust of an unsympathetic and indifferent leadership, they had become resigned to their unhappy lot. Transfer of civil defense functions to the Department of Defense would be easier than upgrading and revitalizing this orphan agency in the Executive Office of the President.

Furthermore, it would rid the Executive Office of an anomaly which the committee pointed to in a 1958 report; namely, an "operating" agency with some 1,700 personnel.⁹ The Executive Office seemed an inappropriate place for a civil defense agency with conglomerate activities distributed among a Washington, D.C., headquarters staff, an operating base in Battle Creek, Mich., and eight regional offices.

The Department of Defense with its huge budget, its great and varied resources, and its far-flung network of organizations could easily absorb civil defense functions. Undoubtedly a Department-sponsored program would command more public attention and inspire more confidence in the Congress that civil defense would be a serious concern of the Government. In short, transfer of civil defense functions to the Department of Defense promised quick dividends in prestige, performance, and financial support from the Congress.

⁹ H. Rept. 1874, 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 25.

PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED

Problems old and new would come up. Civil defense, it was commonly said, is and must remain essentially civilian in nature. At the same time it must be integrated with military defense to take advantage of the great resources of the Department of Defense and to signify the essential unity of military-civil defense in the nuclear age. Yet civil defense must not encroach upon nor interfere with performance of vital military missions. Conflicting values and objectives such as these would have to be reconciled.

Furthermore, civil defense encompasses many functions and involves many agencies of the Federal Government. Which functions were suitable for transfer to the Department of Defense? Which should remain with the new Office of Emergency Planning? Which should be delegated or redelegated to other Federal departments and agencies? What assurances would there be that the bifurcation of civil defense and resources mobilization functions would not give rise to the overlapping, duplication, and confusion that characterized FCDA-ODM operations for the largest part of a decade? Who would coordinate the interagency relationships? How would the funds be apportioned and programs supervised? What would be the lines of authority and direction to regional offices? Who would deal with State and local agencies of government?

These and many other problems were implicit in the President's civil defense message of May 25, but their solution would wait on future developments and decisions. The message was couched in broad and general terms. The President did not propose initially to transfer all civil defense functions to the Department of Defense but only those for a national program of fallout shelters and certain related measures. In the newspapers, the announcement was written up as proposing a transfer of civil defense functions generally to the Department of Defense. Within the executive branch the sorting-out process was still a matter of discussion, and many details had to be worked out.

II. APPROACHES TO REORGANIZATION

Through the interagency and White House discussions ran different threads of understanding about the functions covered in civil defense and the manner of organizing them. The OCDM made one type of analysis, the Bureau of the Budget another, the Department of Defense a third. Special White House advisers were called in. A management consulting firm, McKinsey & Co., Inc., which had studied the problem on Government contract several years ago, was asked to take a look at it again. The newspapers let the public in on incidents of bureaucratic byplay and maneuvering for position.

CIVIL DEFENSE BY DELEGATION

It was long a tenet of civil defense, written into the 1951 enabling legislation, and affirmed by the McKinsey report in 1957-58,¹⁰ that the resources and capabilities of the Federal departments and agencies should be utilized to the maximum instead of building up a large civil defense agency with parallel or overlapping functions. This utilization, in theory, was accomplished by the process of delegation.

Exploiting the civil defense capabilities of existing departments and agencies seemed to make sense from the standpoint of economical and efficient Government operations. There was also the mobilization planning concept that the nature of contemporary warfare would not allow time to create new Government organizations and agencies after war came. "Built-in" preparedness was believed necessary. Consequently, the delegation technique can be traced both in civil defense and defense mobilization. In the following section (III) we review the alternating organizational arrangements by which these functions have been performed jointly or in separation.

The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (approved by the President January 12, 1951) authorized the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, with the approval of the President, to delegate to the several departments and agencies of the Federal Government appropriate civil defense responsibilities, and to review and coordinate civil defense activities among these departments and agencies and with those of the States and neighboring countries.¹¹

The Office of Defense Mobilization, created by the President under the Defense Production Act of 1950, likewise had authority to delegate or assign mobilization missions to other Federal agencies.¹²

¹⁰ The text of the two-volume McKinsey report is printed as appendix exhibit A to the 1958 civil defense hearings of the Military Operations Subcommittee, and the report is reviewed in H. Rept. 1874, 85th Cong., 2d sess.

¹¹ The delegating authority is contained in sec. 201(b) of the act, Public Law 81-920 (64 Stat. 1246; 50 U.S.C. App. 2281(b)). Sec. 401(c) authorizes, and sec. 405 directs, the Administrator to make maximum use of the services, resources and facilities of existing Federal agencies.

¹² Sec. 703 of Public Law 81-774 (64 Stat. 896; 50 U.S.C. App. 2153(a)) authorized the President to delegate the defense mobilization functions to any officer of any existing or new Government agency, with power in the officer to redelegate. The Office of Defense Mobilization was created by Executive Order 10193 of Dec. 16, 1950 (15 F.R. 9031), to perform and delegate designated functions.

EARLY DELEGATION CONCEPT

In the first few years of their concurrent existence, FCDA and ODM were occupied largely with internal organizational problems. The first discernible effort to bring other Federal agencies into the orbits of civil defense and defense mobilization was reflected in Executive Order 10346 issued by President Truman on April 17, 1952. It required in brief that (1) each Federal department and agency, in cooperation with FCDA, shall prepare plans to make its personnel, materials, facilities, and services available in the civil defense emergency; (2) each Federal department and agency, in cooperation with ODM,^{12a} shall prepare plans for maintaining continuity of its essential functions apart from civil defense requirements; and (3) FCDA shall coordinate utilization of Federal resources related to civil defense with National, State, and local civil defense plans.

This order seemed to treat as mutually exclusive the civil defense and continuity requirements of Government. No priorities or time phasing were indicated. The dual coordinating efforts of FCDA and ODM had no mechanism for integration with each other or with Department of Defense requirements for Federal resources. The several departments and agencies took the assigned responsibilities lightly, and no full-bodied plans ever were drawn up in compliance with this Executive order.

DUAL PROGRAM OF DELEGATIONS

While these earlier plans were still awaiting development, FCDA decided to make formal delegations on its own account, as authorized by the Federal Civil Defense Act. In 1954 it issued two delegations, and in 1955 two more. Altogether 6 departments and 1 agency were, by these 4 delegations, the recipients of some 33 broadly defined areas of responsibility.¹³ The Federal departments were charged with planning for support of community requirements in emergencies.

A parallel program of assignments to Federal agencies was introduced by ODM in 1954. These assignments, known as defense mobilization orders, dealt primarily with resource management. Between 1954 and 1956, ODM issued 11 defense mobilization orders to as many departments and agencies.

By the end of 1956, both FCDA and ODM were busily engaged in producing staff papers seeking a solution to conflicting interests of both agencies in the activities of other Federal agencies. These efforts were spurred by sharp criticism in this committee's 1956 report.¹⁴

It was not that we opposed the full utilization of Federal departments and agencies for civil defense purposes. Rather we saw the delegations as vague in language, broad and indeterminate in scope, ineffectively supervised, and issued from competing or conflicting

^{12a} Functions assigned to the National Security Resources Board under Executive Order 10346 were transferred to the ODM by Executive Order 10438 of Mar. 18, 1953 (18 F.R. 1491).

¹³ FCDA Delegation No. 1, approved by President Eisenhower July 14, 1954, delegated 10 areas of responsibility to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

FCDA Delegation No. 2, approved by the President Sept. 8, 1954, delegated three areas of responsibility to the Secretary of Agriculture, five to the Secretary of Commerce, six to the Secretary of Labor, one to the Attorney General, and three to the Housing and Home Finance Administrator.

FCDA Delegation No. 3, approved by the President Aug. 13, 1955, delegated additional responsibilities to the Secretary of Commerce and new ones to the Secretary of Interior.

FCDA Delegation No. 4, approved by the President Nov. 22, 1955, delegated additional responsibilities to the Secretary of Interior.

¹⁴ H. Rept. 2948, 84th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 50-55. See also H. Rept. 1874, 85th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 10-12.

sources. A root difficulty was the lack in either delegating agency of a master plan against which systematic progress and achievement could be measured. In a broader sense this state of affairs reflected the lack of a national consensus and strategy for home-front preparedness.

Always, there was the question whether the department and agencies were being asked to do something they already were doing, or should be doing, in their normal work; or whether they were to execute specific tasks for the delegating agency. ODM expected them to use their own funds for assigned work; FCDA made limited funds available in the delegations program.

MERGER OF FUNCTIONS

By mid-1958 a merger was effected. Reorganization Plan No. 1 of that year, effective July 1, 1958, replaced FCDA and ODM with a single agency (OCDM) in the Executive Office of the President and vested their several statutory authorities directly in the President. By Executive Order 10773 of July 1, 1958,^{14a} President Eisenhower proceeded to delegate all his newly-acquired functions to the OCDM Director, who in turn would delegate to Federal departments and agencies those function which he did not reserve for his own agency.

The 1958 merger sought these objectives in the delegation or assignment procedure: (1) to consolidate previous delegations issued by FCDA and defense mobilization orders issued by ODM; (2) to outline the whole emergency preparedness role of each Federal department or agency, including functions previously assigned or implied by law, Executive order, or agreement, as well as those inherent in its normal peacetime work; (3) to clarify interagency relationships by stipulating which agency should have primary and which supporting responsibilities in emergency preparedness planning; and (4) to reemphasize the central planning and coordinating role of OCDM acting on behalf of the President.

EXPANDED DELEGATIONS PROPOSED

The President advised the Congress in presenting Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958 that one of OCDM's "first tasks" would be to advise him what must be done to clarify and expand the preparedness functions of the departments and agencies in nonmilitary defense.¹⁵

After reading the President's message which accompanied the 1958 reorganization plan and hearing an explanation from the principal witnesses, the committee concluded in a 1958 report:¹⁶

It is apparent from these statements, and from supporting testimony, that the "delegations" concept will loom large in Federal civil defense and that the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization will be primarily a staff coordinating agency. This reflects the McKinsey report concept that a

^{14a} 23 F.R. 5061; 50 U.S.C. App. 2201.

¹⁵ H. Doc. 375, 85th Cong., 2d sess.

¹⁶ H. Rept. 1874, 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 19. The quotation uses the agency's initial name, the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization. The name was changed to Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization by Public Law 85-763 (72 Stat. 861), approved Aug. 26, 1961.

principal function of the new agency will be "to visualize the whole of our nonmilitary preparedness," while operating plans would be prepared by other Federal departments and agencies and by State and local governments. The Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization would be responsible for seeing that these plans were forthcoming, were properly coordinated, and were tested and evaluated.

Heeding the President's request for advice on the clarification and expansion of the Federal department and agency roles, the newly created OCDM reexamined existing civil defense delegations and mobilization assignments. Since the President himself held the reins of statutory authority in these fields, the OCDM Director decided to restate the delegations and assignments as Executive orders to be issued by the President. In this way it was expected that the delegate departments and agencies would be impressed with the importance of the assigned missions and would exert more effort to carry them out.

Nine basic Executive orders were developed by OCDM and cleared through the Bureau of the Budget, the Department of Justice, and the affected departments and agencies. These orders were intended for the Departments of Agriculture; Commerce; Health, Education, and Welfare (two); Interior; Labor; Post Office; and for the Federal Aviation Agency and the Housing and Home Finance Agency. However, they never came to the President's hand for signature.

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ORDERS

A few days before the change of administration, Executive Order 10902, dated January 9, 1961, came forth instructing the OCDM Director to issue orders to the departments and agencies by his own delegated authority. According to the enabling Executive order, the OCDM delegations or assignments were to be known as "emergency preparedness orders." They would provide for the development of civil defense and defense mobilization plans and programs by the several departments and agencies of the executive branch to meet all conditions of national emergency, including attack upon the United States. Policy direction and central program control would remain in OCDM.

The unsigned Executive orders previously drafted and cleared were quickly converted into emergency preparedness orders. The first group was issued by OCDM Director Hoegh on January 10, 1961. Other orders in process were issued subsequently. Altogether 32 orders were planned. When the new administration came in, 14 orders had been issued; 16 were in process of interagency clearance; and 2 were still under negotiation.

Other agencies, for which formal assignments were not intended, received a letter from the OCDM Director requesting them to plan for temporary suspension of such of their normal peacetime functions as could not be practically administered for a substantial period following enemy attack. In this event, their resources would be reassigned to emergency missions.

NEW DIRECTOR'S APPROACH

When Mr. Ellis succeeded Mr. Hoegh as OCDM Director, he proposed not to abandon the delegations concept but to strengthen it by rejuvenating the idea of Presidential Executive orders to the departments and agencies. A thoroughgoing delegations approach would squeeze out many "operating" functions of OCDM and compress the agency into a smaller, more compact planning and coordinating unit. This was said to be the philosophy and intent of the 1958 reorganization plan, but there were those who believed that OCDM, in the 3 years of its existence, had delegated too sparingly; that it preferred to build its own civil defense empire. This view was reflected in the following paragraph of the latest McKinsey report:¹⁷

The failure of OCDM to delegate more fully and to utilize to a greater degree the established agencies of the Federal Government has been in part the result of the growth of this agency. This, in turn, caused the creation of vested interests which prevented the agency from objectively adapting itself and the whole Federal structure to changing concepts of war, growing enemy capabilities, and the evolving technology of defense.

Director Ellis shared this view. In a February 1961 report to the President, shortly after taking office, he observed that preoccupation of the OCDM staff with civil defense operations tended to subordinate the agency's basic planning and coordinating responsibilities.

For OCDM to assume its proper role in the Executive Office—

Mr. Ellis said—

it must divest itself of all operating functions that can be performed by other agencies; it must concentrate on directing and coordinating the total nonmilitary defense effort.¹⁸

PROPOSED CIVIL DEFENSE ASSIGNMENTS

Operating functions which Mr. Ellis thought immediately suitable for delegation were attack warning to the Department of Defense, and the national communications system to the General Services Administration. Additionally he suggested that OCDM "program planning" functions in the following categories might be delegated: Radiological defense to the Department of Defense; stockpiling of critical and strategic materials to the Department of Commerce; education and training programs to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The new delegations should be made as soon as possible, Mr. Ellis said, and these, together with the 15 delegations for mobilization and emergency planning lately made by his predecessor, should be issued as Executive orders.

¹⁷ The McKinsey report, entitled "Transferring Greater Responsibilities for Nonmilitary Defense to the Department of Defense," and submitted to the Bureau of the Budget under date of July 14, 1961, is printed in the 1961 hearings as app. 12, p. 508.

¹⁸ Mr. Ellis' report, dated February 1961, is entitled: "Basic Report of Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization: Roles, Organizations and Programs." It contains some classified information and has not been publicly released.

Concerning shelter functions, Mr. Ellis proposed that at this stage of development it would seem more appropriate to leave them with OCDM. As the shelter program developed, consideration would be given to delegating responsibility for its conduct.

In responding to Mr. Ellis' call for firm and positive Presidential leadership in civil defense, President Kennedy preempted by his May 25 message some of the recommended decisions on delegations. Shelter is, as we have observed, the key civil defense function. Whoever had responsibility for shelter protection would have the core of the civil defense program. Mr. Ellis acknowledged as much when he said to the subcommittee: "Without shelter there is no civil defense."¹⁹

Thus, when the Department of Defense received this assignment, it seemed that Mr. Ellis, but 3 months in office at the time of the May 25 Presidential announcement, was being asked to preside at the near-liquidation of his agency.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE VIEWS

Secretary McNamara was more than an interested spectator. The subject of civil defense was one of the scores of study projects he had instituted soon after taking office. He recognized the importance of civil defense and the substantial contributions that his Department could make to an effective program.

A report submitted to Secretary McNamara by the General Counsel's Office in June 1961 went on the assumption that the President's message signified the devolvement of major civil defense responsibilities on the Department of Defense. It examined the organizational problems for the Department posed by a major civil defense assignment.²⁰

First of all, the report recognized that a new national civil defense program would have a profound impact on American ways. It would touch directly the individual citizen and his family. It would put new tasks on communities and States as well as the Federal Government. It would affect significantly the economic and political life of the Nation.

The Department of Defense would have responsibilities thrust upon it which required many more contacts with the civilian population and new ways of dealing with local communities and government agencies. A civil defense organization within the Department of Defense must retain its "essential civilian orientation" and enjoy a position of prestige and importance for effective work with agencies at all levels of government.

More than prestige was involved. In case of attack, the military would be called upon for many tasks, and the civil defense organization would have to be capable of handling many kinds of emergencies. It would require a command and control system adequate for the performance of its postattack functions.

The varied tasks comprehending civil defense, both before and after an attack, were closely associated with many other defense functions and activities; yet they were sufficiently identifiable and important to

¹⁹ 1961 hearings, p. 50.

²⁰ The General Counsel's report, dated June 18, 1961, is entitled "A Report to the Secretary of Defense on the Organizational Questions Involved if Major Civil Defense Functions are Assigned to the Department of Defense." It contains some classified information and has not been publicly released.

justify a separate organization and budget. But whatever duties were put upon the Active and Reserve forces for civil defense purposes, combat readiness must not be adversely affected.

FOUR ORGANIZATIONAL OPTIONS

With considerations such as these in mind, the Secretary would have "four organizational options" for civil defense. The top level civil defense job could be assigned to: (1) An Assistant Secretary of Defense; (2) the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (3) the Secretary of a military department; or (4) a new Civil Defense Administrator within the Department.

Assistant Secretary for Civil Defense?

The first option was rather convenient because a vacancy then existed among the seven authorized Assistant Secretaries of Defense. The vacancy could be filled by appointing an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense.²¹

While this step would place the civil defense unit high in the hierarchy of the Department, Assistant Secretaries tend to be rather anonymous functionaries and rarely enjoy national prestige. An Assistant Secretary for Civil Defense would be a principal staff adviser to the Secretary, but he would have the usual problems of his office level. He could not issue direct orders to heads of military departments or unified commanders. There was also the prospect, not welcome in the military departments, that a sizable "operating" function for civil defense would be developed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Joint Chiefs' control?

Suppose the Joint Chiefs of Staff took over the civil defense function (option 2). The tasks would be new and dissimilar to those now in their cognizance and would invite charges that civil defense was being subordinated to a military organization. This would fall short of the promise in the President's May 25 message that the function would remain civilian in nature and leadership.

Furthermore, the Joint Chiefs would not personally administer the program. They would have to be represented by other military officers in negotiations with Federal agencies and State-local governments. Yet principal officers on the Joint Staff were precluded by law from exercising executive authority over any Department organization.^{21a}

An operating agency for civil defense established under the Joint Chiefs not only would be several steps down the ladder from the Secretary's Office but would involve the Joint Chiefs deeply with

²¹ This option was chosen by President Kennedy, who announced on Aug. 30, 1961, that Stewart L. Pittman, a Washington attorney, was his nominee as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense. In the interim, civil defense activities in the Department of Defense were put in charge of Adam Yarmolinsky, the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

The Defense Department Reorganization Act, Public Law 85-599, sec. 10(a) (72 Stat. 521; 5 U.S.C. 171(c)), authorized 7 assistant secretary positions. In February-March 1961, the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Medical) was dropped; the function was assumed by deputy assistant (Health and Medical) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower). At the same time, the position of the Assistant Secretary (Installations) was merged with that of the Assistant Secretary (Supply and Logistics), becoming the present Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics).

^{21a} 10 U.S.C. 143(d).

organizational elements not subject to their operational control. The military head of a civil defense agency in this case would not be likely to have the status or prestige for effectively administering a new civil defense program.

Military Department control?

The third option was more promising—assigning civil defense functions to one of the military departments. Each department had a continental command organization which might be adapted, but the Army seemed the most appropriate for this work. It already exercised certain planning and coordinating functions for civil defense in the Department of Defense and traditionally was committed to supporting civil authorities in times of emergency or disaster.

Even so, the Secretary of the Army, or of any other military department for that matter, had too many duties to become a Civil Defense Administrator. The likely move would be for him to designate an assistant for civil defense matters. As in the case of the Joint Chiefs of Staff option, this would be a downgrading process for civil defense, or else it would dilute the principal departmental mission for organization, training, and equipping of combatant forces. Other problems would arise in adjusting the continental field organization of one service to utilize personnel and Reserve components of other services.

Civil Defense Administrator?

The fourth option—designation of a new Civil Defense Administrator in the Department of Defense—seemed still more attractive. Put on a par with the departmental Secretaries, but specially designated, he could enjoy high governmental status and prestige, and organize and budget for civil defense activities separate from other Department functions. At the same time the “civilian” nature of the civil defense effort would be more clearly manifest. The Administrator would represent the Secretary of Defense in extended negotiations with representatives of other Federal agencies and of State and local governments.

To establish such a post, said the General Counsel's report, would require the promulgation of a Presidential reorganization plan after civil defense functions are transferred to the Department. Then a civil defense field organization could be established under the Civil Defense Administrator.

PROBLEMS OF FIELD ORGANIZATION

The problem of determining an appropriate field organization was a particularly knotty one and came in for separate analysis in the General Counsel's report. If the civil defense effort was to remain essentially “civilian” in orientation, would that imply civilian direction and policy guidance at main field and regional levels? Military officers dealing with State and local authorities would create touchy issues, particularly where matching funds had to be administered and appeals made for local action. The political tradition of the United States suggested that military commanders would have a difficult role in civil defense.

If field organizations were to be established within the military field structure, then the alternatives were these: Utilize an existing unified command, establish a new unified command, or work through one of the military departments, most suitably the Army.

Outside the military field structure, the alternative would be to establish a new field organization responsible to the Civil Defense Administrator for the execution of all civil defense functions in the Department of Defense except those otherwise assigned (such as warning functions to the North American and Continental Air Defense Commands). The national civil defense regions could be coterminous with the Army areas of the continental United States. Civilian directors of stature and reputation could head up the regional offices.

A field organization of this kind would more clearly delineate civil defense functions in the Department of Defense. It would establish direct lines of responsibility to the Civil Defense Administrator, unlike the military field organizations which would have to reach the Administrator through their own command channels. It would lend itself to strong centralized direction of all Department of Defense resources used in planning and performing emergency community services and other civil defense operations at the regional level. Finally, this civilian-oriented field organization would make it less likely that primary combat missions would be affected.

Of course, numerous problems still would remain. Military and civilian functionaries in civil defense would report through different command channels. In case of martial law, tradition and prevailing policy would place command responsibilities on military authorities, leaving a question mark as to the role of their civilian counterparts in the new civil defense organization.

No alternative offered an easy solution, and indeed, a Department of Defense field organization for civil defense could hardly be developed in any effective and credible way so long as there was no pre-commitment of forces to the civil defense mission in the event of nuclear attack. Military commanders now must plan without knowing whether any units under their command will be available for postattack civil defense purposes. It was suggested in the General Counsel's report that further intensive study of Department of Defense field organization for civil defense would be necessary.

Enlightened by this and other studies of the Department of Defense role in civil defense, Secretary McNamara took the position that if civil defense functions were to be transferred to his Department, as the President announced in his May 25 message, this assignment must be sufficiently broad in scope so that the functions could be effectively performed and the responsibility fixed in his hands.

M'KINSEY ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES

Meanwhile, McKinsey & Co., under Bureau of the Budget auspices, also analyzed the civil defense functions and posed the organizational alternatives. Problems put to the McKinsey group by the Bureau of the Budget were these:

- (1) What functions should be assigned to the Department of Defense in connection with the national shelter program?
- (2) What other functions relating to the shelter program should go to the Department of Defense?
- (3) How should the Department organize itself internally to execute these assignments?
- (4) What is the appropriate role for the Office of Emergency Planning?

The McKinsey report, tendered to the Bureau under date of July 14, 1961, did not answer all these questions conclusively. So far as the transfer of civil defense functions was concerned, it laid out three alternatives for Presidential choice, handicapped somewhat by the fact that the President already had announced his basic decision to the Congress weeks before.

Partial shelter assignment to Defense?

Alternative No. 1 would assign to the Department of Defense some—but not all—shelter functions. Those assigned would include: Determining what kinds of shelters are needed for civilians, how many, and where; setting standards for shelter design, construction, provisioning, and utilization; conducting necessary research and development; and helping to bring the required shelters into being. The last function would involve conducting or sponsoring surveys to identify existing shelter spaces and those which could be upgraded, and participating in possible future programs such as construction of community shelters for civilians in target areas.

These elements of the shelter program, according to the first alternative, would be administered directly by the Department of Defense, but the execution of related elements in the program to bring required shelters into being would be delegated to other departments and agencies. If steps were taken, for example, to construct shelters in existing and new Federal buildings, upgrade shelter spaces in existing structures, and provide incentives to public and private organizations and individuals to provide shelters, a number of Government agencies could be called into play: Housing and Home Finance Agency, General Services Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Department of Treasury, and Veterans' Administration.

Under this approach, other delegations might be made at an early date, such as planning for defenses against chemical, biological, and radiological hazards to the Departments of Agriculture and Health, Education, and Welfare; planning and building and extending the warning and communications systems to General Services Administration; provision of potable water supplies to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare or the Housing and Home Finance Agency; and planning for postattack emergency community services to the Housing and Home Finance Agency.

Extending the delegations would leave the OCDM staff without any significant civil defense functions but would permit it to concentrate on "overall planning and coordination of related programs among Federal, State, and local agencies."

Shelter and related functions?

Alternative No. 2 would go several steps further than alternative No. 1. It would add to the bare bones assignment of shelter planning and development related civil defense activities for which the Department of Defense now has capabilities. Not only would the Department prescribe the number, type, and location of shelters; set standards for design, construction, equipping, and habitation; and help to bring the required shelters into being; the Department would work in the fields of chemical, biological, and radiological defense; attack warning; communications both for monitoring and keeping

shelter populations informed; and emergency community services, involving assistance to State and local governments in the postattack burdens of restoring utilities and water supplies, clearing debris, putting out fires, treating casualties, decontaminating areas, controlling traffic, and maintaining law and order.

Thus the second alternative would encompass a broad range of what are ordinarily included in civil defense functions. Other Federal departments and agencies would be brought into the civil defense picture by "contract" assignments from the Department of Defense. OCDM, redesignated OEP, would retain "responsibility for coordinating major aspects of the above programs among Federal, State, and local agencies involved." These would include assistance to State and local governments in preparing for postattack control (continuity of government) and in meeting the needs for emergency community services. The OEP would continue to plan and coordinate "national resource management functions," and for that reason would retain the National Resources Evaluation Center to do research and operational analyses in this field.

Full civil defense assignment?

Alternative No. 3 would go the whole way in civil defense and transfer to the Department of Defense all "human survival functions." A "total program" for survival would be framed by the Department of Defense; it would assign specific responsibilities to Federal, State, and local government agencies, and it would absorb the advisory and coordinating civil defense functions performed by OCDM in behalf of the President and in relation to State and local units of government. Under the third alternative, OEP would be confined to resources management as distinguished from civil defense functions, approximating the Office of Defense Mobilization concept before the 1958 merger.

PROBLEMS POSED BY ALTERNATIVES

The McKinsey report went on to analyze the issues posed by the several alternatives. The first one, involving the transfer of minimal shelter functions to the Department of Defense, could be expected "to kindle flagging public attention on civil defense and congressional support." At the same time it would keep the Department from achieving a "dominant position" relative to other Federal departments and agencies and State and local governments. On the other hand, this alternative would fix in the Department responsibility for determining shelter needs but leave to many other Federal agencies, reviewed and coordinated by the OEP, responsibility for bringing such shelters into being.

The second alternative, while giving the Department of Defense the opportunity to utilize its capabilities in areas closely related to shelter (warning, chemical, biological, and radiological defense, communications, emergency community services), raised these questions: Would the Department have enough authority, in relation to other Federal departments and agencies and to State and local governments, to insure its ability to establish the protection needed? Was it feasible to have the Department plan the core of the civil defense program and leave the new OEP responsible for supervising the

work of the Federal, State, and local units of government in their assigned responsibilities? Would it be possible to logically separate civil defense functions from those associated with postattack mobilization of essential resources for recuperation and recovery?

The third alternative would overcome some of these objections by putting in the Department of Defense authority both to plan and execute, and giving it the main directorial position relative to Federal-State-local units of government.

This might be too much, suggested the McKinsey report. The jurisdictional sway of the military might be unduly extended. At the same time, military leaders, preoccupied with military objectives, might lose sight of civil defense.

The President's choice among these alternatives, suggested the McKinsey report, must depend on more than organizational factors. True, Government responsibilities must be clearly delineated and properly aligned for effective execution. But the issues were broader than that. The attitude of the public and the conviction of the Congress as to the essentiality of shelter protection must be considered, and these would in important ways determine the nature of the assignment to the Department of Defense.

ALTERNATIVES FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

The McKinsey report then considered the internal organizational problems in the Department of Defense posed by a civil defense assignment. The major concern, it suggested, is to integrate more fully active and passive defense measures without causing the civil defense activity, because of its smaller size, to "get lost" within the Department.

The basic options, according to the McKinsey report, were three: (a) assign civil defense functions to an Administrator for Civil Defense who would rank with the three departmental secretaries; (b) assign these functions to the Secretary of the Army who would be the Department of Defense's principal agent for civil defense and who would, in turn, delegate the main operating functions to the continental armies; or (c) assign civil defense elements as appropriate within the Department to insure integration with other continental defense activities. The last option would, in effect, parcel out civil defense to particular joint or single commands, technical bureaus and services, and other staff units, with coordination at the Department level.

Civil Defense Administrator?

Option (a), said the report, has the principal advantages of focusing maximum attention on the civil defense function and keeping the programs in civilian units. On the other hand, a separate organizational entity for civil defense might work away from the desired integration with military defense and force the new agency to develop separate and duplicate facilities, while competing with military programs for support from the other military services.

Military department control?

Option (b) would place civil defense functions in the Army commands, which now control the principal resources in manpower, equipment, and training likely to be of the greatest help in providing com-

munity services after an attack. But the civil defense job, said the McKinsey report, is larger than that of providing emergency community services. For example, the North American and Continental Air Defense Commands would be depended on for warning; the Air Weather Service for chemical, biological, and radiological monitoring. Thus command units several echelons away from the Secretary of Defense would have major coordinating jobs. Also, this option would leave the civil defense effort open to charges of "military control."

Assistant Secretary to coordinate?

Option (c) would bring to bear on civil defense functions the broadest and fullest capacities of the Department of Defense. According to the McKinsey report, "It emphasizes and recognizes to the greatest degree the interrelated nature of military and nonmilitary defense and would probably result in the best coordinated planning."

The report favored this option even though it would bring military personnel more directly in contact with State and local authorities and thus introduce the question of "military control." Also, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and important military commanders might be distracted from their "military" missions by added civil defense responsibilities. "On the other hand," the report rejoins, "does not the continental defense mission necessarily include saving the lives of civilians?"

Asking that option (c) be given the fullest consideration, the McKinsey report added that to prevent the civil defense activity from "getting lost," an assistant to the Secretary of Defense or perhaps one of the present Assistant Secretaries could be assigned responsibility for overall coordination of the Department's civil defense work and for serving as its principal spokesman on the subject.

M'KINSEY ON OEP'S ROLE

Finally, the McKinsey report addressed itself to the role of the OEP. The lessons of 15 years of experience with civil defense were that public concern, congressional support, and State-local preparatory action depended upon the active leadership, support, and involvement of the President of the United States. The President must take the leadership in conveying to the American people the nature of the threat and what they must do as individuals and families and agencies of government to make preparations. This being the case, the President must develop concepts and policies upon which plans could be grounded for protecting the civilian population and making best use of the country's resources for cold war, limited war, or general nuclear war purposes.

In discharging this obligation the President would require staff assistance to guide the Federal departments and agencies; to coordinate their efforts; to develop plans for such emergency activities as the allocation of scarce resources, control of transportation, economic controls and censorship; to promote public understanding of the nature of alternative threats; to insure the adequacy of preparations by government units at all levels; and to set forth the obligations of the individual and his family.

Thus, under any of the three alternatives regarding the transfer of civil defense functions to the Department of Defense, the OEP would have to continue, within the framework of the Executive Office of the President, as a staff arm of the Chief Executive. Individual departments and agencies, under this concept, would be expected to review their plans with OEP and seek its aid in resolving interagency differences before presenting such differences to the President.

The OEP would be responsible for insuring that the country's resources—human, physical, scientific, and other—would be utilized effectively in waging the cold war, or in limited or nuclear wars. It would stimulate and aid State and local governments to develop means for insuring continuity of political authority. The report concluded with this exalted concept of the OEP's place in the Government scene:

The Director of the Office of Emergency Planning would be, as the Director of OCDM is now, the President's principal spokesman on nonmilitary defense matters. His staff would review proposed programs and enunciate policies and set national goals in the nonmilitary defense field. It would shape the program in the broadest overall sense and would coordinate and arbitrate Federal agency roles and activities. It would give leadership to the Federal Government's emergency resources management preparations and act as the President's eyes and ears for checking on progress throughout the Nation.

Finally, the Office of Emergency Planning would serve as the highest level nonmilitary defense spokesman for the President to the Congress, to the Governors, and to the public at large. It would call on Department of Defense representatives extensively to aid it in performing this function whenever matters relating to the integration of military and non-military defense measures arose or whenever programs for shelter, warning, and the other functions transferred to Defense were under discussion. Similarly, it would call on representatives of other departments on matters relating to their assignment of nonmilitary defense responsibilities. In summary, the Office of Emergency Planning should so guide the Nation's nonmilitary defense programs that a balanced, well articulated, consistent record of progress in such programs is maintained in improving our Nation's preparedness for whatever type of warfare may be inflicted upon it.

MR. ELLIS' FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS

By the time the McKinsey report had been submitted in formal written form to the Bureau of the Budget, the contending parties had pretty well shaken down their differences, and OCDM Director Ellis was tentatively persuaded to accept the new order of things. His memorandum to the President dated July 7, 1961 (a week before the formal submission of the McKinsey report), emphasized the President's leadership and responsibility for "nonmilitary defense," laid out a Presidential advisory, assistance, and coordinating role for OEP similar to that prescribed by McKinsey & Co., and recommended that

"responsibility for the total civil defense program" be assigned to the Secretary of Defense.²²

This assignment would involve not only the development and execution of a fallout shelter program but chemical, biological, and radiological defense, attack warning to civilian authorities, a postattack communications network, emergency assistance to State and local governments and communities, postattack damage assessment, administration of Federal matching funds for State and local civil defense programs, assistance to States and localities in planning for damage control operations and continuity of government, the donable surplus property program for civil defense purposes, and postattack direction, both nationally and regionally, for the movement of aid and resources to attacked areas. In fulfilling these responsibilities, Director Ellis contemplated that the Secretary of Defense would use other Federal departments and agencies by contract or other agreement.

Two other specific assignments were recommended: To the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare responsibility for developing and maintaining national stocks of medical supplies; and to the Department of Agriculture responsibility for estimating post-attack national food requirements and planning for availability of food to the surviving population until such time as adequate food production could be resumed.

In both cases, the assigned agencies were to work closely with the Department of Defense and the OEP. Finally, OEP was to maintain general coordination of the research, training, and public information required for the assigned agency programs.

PROMULGATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER

Director Ellis' memorandum was released to the public on July 20, 1961. The same day President Kennedy promulgated Executive Order 10952, which he said put into effect the recommendations in that memorandum.²³ The White House press release accompanying the Executive order quoted the President as follows:²⁴

More than ever, a strong civil defense program is vital to the Nation's security. Today, civil defense is of direct concern to every citizen and at every level of government.

(The President's remarks were amplified in a direct television address to the American people on July 25.²⁵)

According to the White House press release:

The Secretary of Defense will be in charge of Federal programs for the protection of the Nation's civilian population against the dangers of nuclear attack. * * * The Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization will advise and assist the President in coordinating the civil defense operations of all executive departments.

²² The text of Mr. Ellis' memorandum is printed in the 1961 hearings as app. 2, p. 376.
²³ Executive Order 10952 of July 20, 1961 is printed in the 1961 hearings as app. 3A, p. 379.

²⁴ The text of the White House release is printed in the 1961 hearings as app. 3B, p. 381.
²⁵ The part of the President's speech pertaining to civil defense is printed in the 1961 hearings as app. 1B, p. 376.

The President was further quoted as follows:

In calling upon the resources of the Department of Defense to stimulate and invigorate our civil defense preparations, I am acting under the basic Federal premise that responsibility for the accomplishment of civil defense preparations at the Federal level is vested in me. In the States and localities, similar responsibilities are vested in the Governors and local executives. It is my hope that they, too, will redouble their efforts to strengthen our civil defense and will work closely with the Department of Defense in its new assignment.

Civil defense, like other elements of the total nonmilitary defense program, reaches into virtually every phase of our government and of our national life. I shall accordingly be actively concerned with the problem of coordinating our civil defense preparations with other nonmilitary defense preparations required to achieve a strong position for our Nation. In this, I shall be represented and assisted by the Director of the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.

The White House release also noted that the President complimented Mr. Ellis and the OCDM organization on their vigorous civil defense efforts since the Director took office and on "his constructive attitude in consultations leading to agreement on the new program direction."

III. EXECUTIVE ORDER 10952

To understand Executive Order 10952 in its statutory and policy setting, we should keep in mind two lines of development in government organization, sometimes parallel, sometimes converging. One of these is concerned with civil defense functions; the other with defense mobilization (more recently called resources management) functions.

EARLIER DEVELOPMENTS

In the early post-World War II years, civil defense planning functions were centered in the defense establishment. A Civil Defense Board, established by the War Department, submitted a report in February 1947 which stressed the importance and urgency of civil defense planning under Federal leadership and direction.²⁶ This was followed by an Office of Civil Defense Planning, a "temporary administrative organ" attached to the office of the first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal. This study group submitted a report in October 1948 outlining the structure of a permanent civil defense organization to supply the "missing link" in national defense.²⁷

Both defense planning units, in examining the organizational alternatives for a Federal civil defense agency, favored civilian leadership but proposed that the agency be located within the Department of Defense.

In March 1949, responsibility for civil defense planning was transferred by President Truman from the Department of Defense to the National Security Resources Board, a nonmilitary agency created by the National Security Act of 1947, to advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization. To maintain close cooperation and liaison, the Secretary of Defense created in his office an Assistant for Civil Defense Liaison.²⁸

In 1950, the National Security Resources Board, under the chairmanship of Stuart Symington, published a report entitled "United States Civil Defense." The recommendations in this report became the framework of the civil defense legislation enacted by the Congress and approved by the President on January 12, 1951.

The Federal Civil Defense Administration created by the act absorbed the "functions, property, and personnel of the National Security Resources Board concerned with civil defense activities."²⁹ Thus, civil defense and resource mobilization functions, which had been combined in the National Security Resources Board, again were separated.

²⁶ "A Study of Civil Defense," released by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in February 1948.

²⁷ "Civil Defense for National Security," report to the Secretary of Defense by the Office of Civil Defense Planning, October 1948.

²⁸ Semiannual Report of the Secretary of Defense, July 1-Dec. 31, 1949, pp. 32-33.

²⁹ Public Law 81-920, sec. 404; 50 U.S.C. App. 2256; 64 Stat. 1256.

The year 1950, which culminated the work of the National Security Resources Board in civil defense planning, also saw the onset of the Korean crisis and the enactment of the Defense Production Act to speed production and resource mobilization. By authority of that act, President Truman established an Office of Defense Mobilization.³⁰

For the next 2½ years there were two civilian agencies in the Executive Office of the President concerned with mobilization planning—the National Security Resources Board oriented toward long-range studies, and the Office of Defense Mobilization more directly involved in the Korean war effort. Calling this an "artificial" separation of functions, President Eisenhower abolished the National Security Resources Board and merged its functions with those of the Office of Defense Mobilization in a reconstituted agency of the same name.³¹

Civil defense and defense mobilization continued their separate ways, however, with considerable overlap and confusion, compounded by the participating interest of the Department of Defense in both sets of functions.³² Finally, in 1958, by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of that year, President Eisenhower merged FCDA and ODM, reserving for himself their statutory authorities, and delegating the combined functions to a new Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.³³ From an organizational standpoint, civil defense and resource mobilization functions were joined together again for a 3-year period until Executive Order 10952 of July 20, 1961.

DOD CIVIL DEFENSE ROLE: 1961-

President Kennedy's order transfers from the OCDM Director to the Secretary of Defense the civil defense functions authorized by the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended, with certain exceptions. Legally, the President retains all final authority for the civil defense program, as he does for defense mobilization. The authority to the Secretary of Defense is "delegated" from the President.

The following seven civil defense functions are cited in the order for transfer to the Secretary of Defense:

- (1) A fallout shelter program;
- (2) A chemical, biological, and radiological warfare defense program;
- (3) All steps necessary to warn or alert Federal military and civilian authorities, State officials, and the civilian population;
- (4) All functions pertaining to communications including a warning network, reporting on monitoring, instructions to shelters, and communications between authorities;
- (5) Emergency assistance to State and local governments in a postattack period, including water, debris, fire, health, traffic, police, and evacuation capabilities;

³⁰ See footnote 12.

³¹ Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1953 (effective June 12, 1953 (18 F.R. 3375; 67 Stat. 634; 5 U.S.C. 1332-15). The plan also transferred to the Office of Defense Mobilization certain stockpiling and other functions vested by statute in military agencies. See H. Doc. 120, 83d Cong., 1st sess.

³² H. Rept. 2946, 84th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 54-58.

³³ See footnote 6.

(6) Protection and emergency operational capability of State and local government agencies in keeping with plans for the continuity of government;

(7) Programs for making financial contributions to the States (including personnel and administrative expenses) for civil defense purposes.

Additionally, the Secretary is asked to develop plans and operate systems for nationwide damage assessment after attack and to make necessary arrangements for the donation of Federal surplus property for civil defense purposes.

The above functions are included in, but do not limit, the scope of the delegation which, except for the functions specifically reserved to the President, is as broad as the Federal Civil Defense Act. The Secretary of Defense will make contractual or other agreements with other Federal departments or agencies, when necessary or appropriate in exercising his assigned civil defense functions. Also, he will work with State and local authorities.

ORGANIZATIONAL BASE FOR CIVIL DEFENSE

The Executive order reestablishes the pre-1958 division of labor between civil defense and defense mobilization with this important difference. For the first time since the early planning work after World War II, civil defense will be housed in a regular Cabinet department of the Government—and in the biggest department of them all, the Department of Defense.

Furthermore, this is not just a "delegation" in the sense used by FCDA, and later OCDM, to parcel out civil defense responsibilities among the departments and agencies. The new Executive order directs a shift in the base of operations for civil defense. The Department of Defense, under this mandate, is not simply one of several departments "doing something for OCDM." These other agencies will be "doing something for the Department of Defense."

Generally, the decision to maintain a broad departmental base of operations for civil defense accords with the committee's view that civil defense by delegation, as formerly exercised, was impossible of achievement. Thus we said in a 1958 report, upon recognizing that all Government resources must be effectively used for civil defense purposes:³⁴

It does not follow, however, that all the tasks of civil defense and mobilization can be parceled out among the agencies. The subcommittee is satisfied that there are enough important tasks in civil defense and mobilization to justify a strong organizational base for these activities, even while other governmental resources are utilized. Certain of these tasks, such as radiological defense and shelter planning and construction, are so unprecedented and difficult that they justify a special entity of Government planning and working on its own as well as in cooperation with other Government agencies.

³⁴ H. Rept. 1874, 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 24.

In the FCDA the organizational base was present, but the agency lacked the prestige of Cabinet rank, competence, firm leadership, and understanding of the order of essentiality in civil defense tasks. In OCDM, as a unit of the Executive Office of the President, a strong organizational base for civil defense operations was an anomaly. The committee proposed at one time that the importance and urgency of civil defense justified a separate department of Cabinet rank. The assignment of civil defense responsibilities to the Department of Defense is a compromise.

This important reorientation of civil defense, we may suppose, flowed from Secretary McNamara's insistence that if he were to take on the civil defense job, it must be big enough to fix responsibility in his Department. Responsibility, we note again, would go with the shelter program—the biggest part of the civil defense job in terms of priorities, dollars, planning, and operations. When OCDM Director Ellis yielded up the shelter functions, he yielded up civil defense.

Other civil defense measures are important also, but most of them are "shelter-oriented." As we noted in our 1956 report, shelter is central to civil defense planning and operations.³⁵ In taking on the civil defense assignment, Secretary McNamara has accepted a heavy burden of responsibility.

NEW KINDS OF COORDINATION

In this context we can understand better the problems of civil defense "coordination." The Department of Defense, holding by delegation primary Federal responsibility for civil defense, will not be interested in allotting broad areas or segments of this responsibility to other departments or agencies, as was done by FCDA and OCDM in the past. Instead, the Department of Defense will execute contracts or enter into agreements with these departments or agencies for the execution of specific civil defense tasks and will supply the necessary funds.

This kind of coordination, which requires the Secretary of Defense to pull together the resources and services of other Federal departments and agencies in discharging his civil defense duties, will be the lesser of his burdens. The Secretary will be faced with the problems of coordinating the civil defense activities and potentials of his own vast Department, and of the field agencies and State-local units of government which will figure in civil defense operations.

In dealing with Federal departments and agencies, and with State and local leaders, the Secretary will have to show patience and tact and take care to avoid criticism of "military" domination. He will have to make them understand, at the same time, that progress must be made and that positive achievements will be expected.

The studies of organizational alternatives which we reviewed above, suggest that the civil defense organization within the Department will have to be sufficient in size and authority to command respect and attention and cooperation from the military services and to avoid "getting lost" in the vast reaches of the defense establishment. It will require a separate budget and separately identified

³⁵ H. Rept. 2946, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 20.

functions. At the same time, care must be taken to avoid a buildup of duplicating facilities and resources.

We call upon all military authorities and organizations to bring to bear their best talents and their great resources in executing assigned civil defense tasks, recognizing always that vital military missions must go forward.

SECRETARY'S COMMANDING POSITION

As far as military agencies and resources are concerned, despite the immense difficulties of coordination, the Secretary will have this advantage: That he is the civilian "commander" of the entire defense establishment. His word will be law to the responsible military department heads and military command chiefs. In this position of overriding authority and command, the Secretary of Defense will be able not only to coordinate military resources and services for civil defense work but to prevent major military policy decisions and actions which conflict unnecessarily with civil defense objectives.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civil Defense cannot speak, of course, with the same voice of authority as the Secretary. Consequently important civil defense actions will have to be ordered in the Secretary's name. The committee is convinced that Secretary McNamara believes in the value of an effective civil defense program and is prepared to give it the necessary attention and direction, notwithstanding the heavy burdens already placed upon him as the civilian head of the great defense organization.

In the transfer of civil defense functions, the Secretary of Defense inherits a substantial organization built up in FCDA and OCDM within the past decade. Approximately 1,000 persons have been transferred to the Department from OCDM. Careful scrutiny must be given to the qualifications of transferred personnel so that the incompetent and indifferent ones can be weeded out. We expect also that the Secretary will recruit new skills and talents from industry, the universities, and other sources for the performance of difficult technical and other tasks in civil defense.

It is encouraging to the committee to note, now that civil defense has received Presidential blessing and Department of Defense sanction, that many new technical ideas are coming to the fore. American industry is becoming interested in the contract dollars expected to flow for civil defense. We expect that all new and promising ideas will be rapidly received, screened, and assimilated, where appropriate, by the Department of Defense to shortcut tasks and save dollars. The transitional period marking the transfer of civil defense functions is a trying one, but the Department has indicated already that it is determined to move ahead with dispatch in the first tasks of its new assignment.

OEP CIVIL DEFENSE ROLE: 1961-

What remains in the civil defense field for the OEP Director? The Executive order calls upon him to "advise and assist the President" in these respects:

- (1) Determining policy for, planning, directing, and coordinating, including the obtaining of information from all departments and agencies, the total civil defense program.

(2) Reviewing and coordinating the civil defense activities of the Federal departments and agencies with each other and with the activities of the States and neighboring countries.

(3) Determining the appropriate civil defense roles of Federal departments and agencies, enlisting State, local, and private participation, mobilizing national support, evaluating progress of programs, and preparing reports to the Congress relating to civil defense matters.

(4) Helping and encouraging the States to negotiate and enter into interstate civil defense compacts and enact reciprocal civil defense legislation.

(5) Providing all practical assistance to States in arranging, through the Department of State, mutual civil defense aid between the States and neighboring countries.

In addition to these advisory and assisting roles to the President, the OEP Director is asked to develop plans, conduct programs, and coordinate preparations for the continuity of governmental operations, Federal, State, and local, in the event of attack. Planning and preparation for State-local continuity of government operations will—

be designed to assure the continued effective functioning of civilian political authority under any emergency condition.

RESERVED CIVIL DEFENSE FUNCTIONS

More than a little confusion has been created by the Executive order concerning OEP's role in civil defense. In testimony before the subcommittee, Director Ellis interpreted the order as conferring upon his agency a positive mandate to set policy, assign duties, and co-ordinate functions, including those of the Department of Defense, in the Federal civil defense program. He pointed to the power of delegation conferred on the civil defense chief by the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 and noted that this authority is specifically withheld from the Secretary of Defense.³⁶

Under the terms of Executive Order 10952, the President specifically reserves *for himself* and excludes from the delegation to the Secretary of Defense the following functions:

(1) Those provisions of the civil defense law relating to procurement and distribution of materials and financial grants so far as they apply to medical and food stockpiles (to be delegated later to other agencies);

(2) Appointment of the Civil Defense Advisory Council;

(3) Delegations to Federal agencies; and

(4) Emergency authority prescribed in title III of the act.

The Executive order leaves in effect all other directives and regulations not specifically changed or superseded by the order, and it does not terminate any delegation or assignment of any (program) function to Federal departments and agencies issued by the OCDM Director as an "emergency preparedness order." However, none of these delegations is to limit the delegation made to the Secretary of Defense by the Executive order.

The confusion about OEP's role, it would seem, derives from (1) differences of understanding as to the "advisory" or staff role of

³⁶ 1961 hearings, p. 65.

OEP, and (2) the rather chaotic situation in "delegations" to Federal departments and agencies consequent upon the division of civil defense and defense mobilization functions.

OEP'S ADVISORY STATUS

First of all, we may note, OEP has no significant statutory powers in its own right. These are vested in the President by Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1958. Consequently, civil defense functions or authorities specifically withheld from the Secretary of Defense are formally reserved to the President and not to the OEP Director.

The Executive order is clear on that point. Whatever policy, supervisory, or coordinating functions OEP performs in the civil defense field, will be done by virtue of its mandate to assist and advise the President. Except in this advisory role, the OEP Director is expressly relieved of civil defense responsibilities delegated to his predecessor by the President in 1958.

Budget Director Bell, in describing OEP's advisory role, put it this way:³⁷

* * * the OEP itself will not assign functions or responsibilities to other departments or agencies; instead, it will advise the President in doing so, and assist the President in reviewing performance under those assignments. The Department of Defense, under section 1 of Executive Order 10952, is instructed to work "as necessary or appropriate through other agencies by contractual or other agreements" in performing the functions delegated by the President to the Department under the order. In carrying out this part of the order, the Department will be expected to establish a series of working arrangements with other departments and agencies, but these will be in the nature of contracts or agreements, and not in the nature of Presidential delegations.

* * * It will be the President, of course, and not the OEP who will supervise the performance of the Department of Defense under Executive Order 10952. In assisting the President in the exercise of his powers, the OEP, like any other Presidential staff agency, will have influence and effect in direct proportion to the competence of its performance. A Presidential staff agency cannot exert influence except as it can make a real contribution to the execution of governmental functions. It must demonstrate its value not only to the President but to the departments and agencies as well. We expect that the new OEP, slimmed down and freed of operating burdens, will be able to make such a contribution.

PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATIONS

The delegation of civil defense responsibilities to the Secretary of Defense, we have already suggested, stands on a different footing than delegations issued by OCDM. By Executive Order 10952 the Presi-

³⁷ Statement submitted by the Bureau of the Budget in response to subcommittee questions, 1961 hearings, app. 5, p. 387.

dent has in effect rescinded a delegation of civil defense functions to OCDM and has made a new delegation to the Secretary of Defense.

This new delegation encompasses many, but not all, civil defense functions. Executive Order 10952 was followed by Executive Order 10958, dated August 14, 1961, which delegated to the Departments of Agriculture and Health, Education, and Welfare, respectively, the temporarily reserved food and medical stockpiling functions.³⁸ In relation to these other two agencies, as to the Department of Defense, the OEP Director retains the responsibility of advising and assisting the President in supervision and coordination.

Whether further Presidential delegations of civil defense functions will be made is not yet known.³⁹ It would seem, however, that the vesting of a large area of civil defense responsibility in the Department of Defense by Executive Order 10952, and of related functions in the two other Departments by Executive Order 10958, largely covers the field.

What, then, is the status of the emergency preparedness orders which represent delegations or assignments by the OCDM Director, acting in turn under authority delegated to him by the President? Those that have been issued remain in force and in effect by the terms of Executive Order 10952. As described earlier, OEP proposes that these be converted into Executive orders and issued, along with other Executive orders, to a large number of executive departments and agencies.

If these delegations or assignments henceforth are issued directly by the President, the recipient agencies may well take them more seriously, as it is hoped; but by the same token the agencies will consider themselves directly answerable to the President rather than to OEP. The Executive orders will have the status of a direct delegation from the President rather than a redelegation from OEP, and OEP will no longer have a place in the line of executive authority. The issuance of Executive orders for defense mobilization as well as civil defense will finally make clear OEP's advisory role to the President.

PROBLEMS OF THE TRANSITION

In the meantime, the changeover period, which involves transferring to the Department of Defense not only civil defense functions and authorities on paper, but personnel, facilities, and funds, will be attended by new or continuing interagency conflicts. The difficulties will arise, in large part, from the inability to cleanly separate civil defense and defense mobilization responsibilities. Undoubtedly the affected agencies will examine every word of Executive Order 10952 to support their contending positions regarding the use and disposition of facilities common to both sets of functions.

Is the National Resources Evaluation Center, for example, a facility for postattack damage assessment, a responsibility charged by the Executive order to the Department of Defense; or is it more properly an instrument for mobilization and management of resources, which remains the responsibility of OEP?

³⁸ Executive Order 10958 of Aug. 14, 1961, is printed in the 1961 hearings as app. 4A, p. 383.

³⁹ According to the Bureau of the Budget, some additional delegations will be made, both in civil defense and defense mobilization, but no time schedule has been set. 1961 hearings, app. 5, p. 386.

Is the classified location to which top-level Government executives will repair in the event of national emergency, a civil defense command post for exercise of Department of Defense postattack responsibilities in this field; or is it an adjunct of OEP's continuing responsibility in making preparations for continuity of Government in case of emergency?

Similar questions could be raised about the proposed regional underground centers, of which the first is under construction at Denton, Tex., and the second is planned in the area of Harvard, Mass. These centers would be important both for civil defense and for continuity of Government functions, as well as others.

Will OEP maintain a separate field organization for execution of its resources management functions; and if so, how will it tie in with the civil defense regional organization to be established by the Secretary of Defense?

The resolution of such knotty problems probably will have a large influence on OEP's future course.

OUTLOOK FOR OEP

There are critics, we have noted above, who say that planning for defense mobilization had suffered and been submerged in OEP's preoccupation with civil defense "operating" functions. Transfer of civil defense responsibilities to the Department of Defense should remove that handicap. On the other hand, OEP is confronted with the inherently difficult problems of planning and coordinating at a distance from the centers of operations. The tendency is for such high-level planning agencies to add to the layers of governmental paperwork and to have only "nuisance" value to the agencies charged with operating responsibilities and spending the major funds.

One of the conventional justifications for the existence of an agency like OEP is the need, in case of war or emergency, to allocate scarce resources among "claimant" agencies. One of the largest claimants is the Department of Defense. Therefore, it is argued, an agency outside the Department of Defense must make the necessary decisions.

In our 1956 report, we suggested that this adjudicating role reflected largely the mobilization concepts of prenuclear warfare.⁴⁰ However, with the new emphasis and attention being given to cold war and limited war requirements, it may well be that OEP can carve out for itself an important planning role in defense mobilization as well as in postattack recovery operations.

The role of the Department of Defense and the military in post-attack operations, however important and varied it may be, cannot continue indefinitely. Restoration of the economic, social, and political institutions must proceed as a civilian effort.

The President wisely has reserved to himself the emergency authority which would be called into play in case of enemy attack on the United States. The time phasing of postattack recovery operations cannot be clearly known in advance. The OEP, by careful planning and intelligent advice and assistance to the President, can play a major leadership role in postattack recovery.

⁴⁰ H. Rept. 2946, 84th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 57-58.
H. Rept. 1249, 87-1—6

OEP's future is assured by the fact that the President requires expert staff assistance and a mechanism for coordinating the work of the Federal departments and agencies in the broad area of what is termed nonmilitary defense. These functions will be properly discharged only if OEP remains small in size and displays competence and imagination heretofore lacking in that staff arm of the Executive. Required in turn is the full support and active interest of the President himself in the work of that agency and in maintaining its prestige so that the best talent in the Nation can be recruited for its service.

In view of the clarification still to be made of OEP's role, its optimum size cannot be easily determined. The Bureau of the Budget, in response to a subcommittee question, has no definite answer at this time.⁴¹ The 1962 Independent Offices Appropriation Act limits the Washington staff of OEP to 310 persons.⁴² This the Bureau considers undesirable in that it impairs flexibility and limits Presidential discretion.⁴³ The present plans call for about 100 field personnel in OEP. A total complement of 300 or 400 persons in field and headquarters seems ample for that agency's tasks.

⁴¹ 1961 hearings, app. 5, p. 386.

⁴² Public Law 87-141 (75 Stat. 342).

⁴³ 1961 hearings, app. 5, p. 386.

IV. EVOLUTION OF A NATIONAL SHELTER POLICY

To understand the rationale as well as the limitations of the national fallout shelter program announced by the President on May 25 and committed to the charge of the Secretary of Defense by Executive Order 10952, we review briefly the evolution of the national shelter policy in civil defense planning.

LESSONS OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI

The American experts who surveyed, with the help of Army and Navy teams, the atomic rack and ruin of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, later asked themselves this question: "What if the target of the bomb had been an American city?"⁴⁴

Granting differences in terrain, layout and zoning, density, and type of construction as between Japanese and American cities, the survey investigators nevertheless believed that the bombing effects would be substantially similar. They noted how few of the buildings in representative American cities contain reinforced concrete, and they concluded that the overwhelming number of the buildings in American cities could not stand up against an atomic bomb bursting a mile or a mile-and-a-half away.

As for the people, although Japanese cities were congested, American cities also have their crowded slums, and buildings are so high vertically that population is dense. The large cities in many cases are much more crowded than the Japanese cities which were attacked.

The survey investigators then considered: "What we can do about it."

They said the danger is real; that the survey findings had scattered through them clues to the measures which could be taken to cut down the potential losses in lives and property. The report said these measures must be taken or initiated now (this was in 1946), if their cost were not to be prohibitive. It observed that if a policy were laid down well in advance of any crisis, there could be timely decentralization of industrial and medical facilities, construction or blue-printing of shelters, and preparation for lifesaving evacuation programs.

PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE

The survey report said at one point:

In our planning for the future, if we are realistic, we will prepare to minimize the destructiveness of such attacks, and so organize the economic and administrative life of the Nation that no single or small group of successful attacks can paralyze the national organism.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, "The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki," June 30, 1946, p. 36.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 38.

To the investigators the most instructive fact at Nagasaki was the survival, even near ground zero, of the few hundred people who were properly placed in the tunnel shelters. They noted that carefully built shelters, though unoccupied, stood up well in both cities.

Without question, shelters can protect those who get to them against anything but a direct hit. Adequate warning will assure that a maximum number get to shelters.

The report called for a program of industrial decentralization and the maintenance of reserve stocks of critical materials and medical supplies as well as capital equipment. Self-sufficient production units and balanced regional economies were suggested in order to eliminate bottlenecks which might choke off productive capacity after an atomic attack.

After considering shelters and decentralization, a few paragraphs were devoted to other aspects of civil defense. The report proposed that mutual assistance be organized on a national level to provide highly trained mobile units for firefighting, rescue work, clearance, and emergency repairs. Such national organization was considered not inconsistent with decentralization.

Most importantly, a national civil defense organization could prepare now the plans for necessary steps in case of crisis. The survey report called for two complementary programs to be worked out in advance:

(1) Evacuation of unnecessary inhabitants from threatened urban areas; and,

(2) Rapid erection of adequate shelters for people who must remain.

The twin concepts of shelter and evacuation dominated civil defense thinking and planning in the early postwar years.

"NOMINAL" BOMB SHELTERS

These were the years of the "nominal" bomb. The phenomenon of "radioactive fallout" and its lethal effects were known to scientists and atomic weapon experts, but these effects were not of immediate concern. The geographic sweep and coverage of the fallout hazard were yet to be shown. Civil defense shelters were regarded primarily as protection against blast and prompt radiation.

To provide shelter protection for all people in all places was considered financially impossible. Shelter planning was pointed toward critical target areas—the places which the enemy was most likely to attack. To stay within economic limits, shelter locations would have to be carefully selected, and existing structures used wherever possible.

Responsibility for shelter construction would be shared by Federal, State, and local authorities. The local administrations would be asked to survey the needs of their areas and execute any planned construction program. The Federal Government would assist by research and education and assume a portion of the construction cost for approved community shelters.

A 1950 report of the National Security Resources Board classified shelter requirements along these lines:⁴⁶

⁴⁶ "United States Civil Defense," p. 36.

(1) Maximum strength for key installations: These would be built in limited numbers to protect key personnel and facilities important to the safety of the community in an emergency.

(2) Moderate strength for population masses in urban centers, for factories of strategic importance, and for suburban community protection: These would include shallower subways, underground garages, one- or two-story monolithic concrete structures, reinforced basements of masonry buildings, and new reinforced concrete shelters.

(3) Improvised for small group and family protection in residential areas: These would include reinforced basements or shored-up dugouts, earth-covered sections of culvert material, and similar improvisations. It was expected that many families would work out their own shelter needs with noncritical and inexpensive materials locally available.

The need for adequate warning to seek shelter in advance of an attack was recognized. This was the premissile era of the manned bomber threat, and air raid warning was largely an Air Force responsibility based on plans for construction and operation of a radar network, rapid communications, and supplementary assistance by a Ground Observer Corps.

In this 1950 period of civil defense planning, evacuation was considered a residual protection device. Evacuations from an industrial plant, city residential block, or industrial city offered one means of mass safety either before or after an attack, depending upon the accuracy and timing of advance warning. However, the disruptive effects upon organized communities and morale of the people made preattack evacuation rather unattractive, and it had a low place in Government planning recommendations.⁴⁷

Generally, evacuation planning would be centered at the State civil defense level. Decisions to evacuate would be made by civil authorities, and priorities for evacuation would remove children, the aged and infirm, and others, leaving behind those serving in essential industrial and other capacities.

LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATIONS

Legislative bills in the Congress in 1950, based largely on the National Security Resources Board report, proposing to create a Federal Civil Defense Administration, reflected the emphasis on shelter building. During House hearings on the 1950 legislation it was stated, however, that a big shelter program was not contemplated. The Federal contribution for shelter construction was estimated at \$1,125 million. Sponsors of the legislation indicated that city surveys on exact shelter locations were awaited, but that the FCDA (administrative predecessor to the statutory agency) officials had the general areas in mind.⁴⁸

In the House report on the 1950 civil defense bill, the \$1,125 million figure for shelters was noted as covering a 3-year period ending June 1954.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

⁴⁸ This and following paragraphs on early shelter plans are adapted from the annex to the committee's 1956 report, H. Rept. 2946, 84th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 82 ff.

The Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, signed by the President January 12, 1951, included in the definition of civil defense—

the construction or preparation of shelters, shelter areas, and control centers; and when appropriate, the nonmilitary evacuation of civil population.

The Administrator was authorized, among other things, to "study and develop civil-defense measures," and among these measures was included "developing shelter designs and materials for protective covering or construction."

Further, the Administrator was authorized to make financial contributions to the States on a matching basis, with the proviso that contributions for shelters and other protective facilities were to be proportioned among the States according to their urban target-area populations. The value of land contributed by any State or locality was not to be figured in the State share of matching funds.

The act barred Federal contributions for dual-purpose shelters but authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, upon certification by the FCDA, to make 50-year loans up to \$250 million for the purpose of aiding civil-defense projects. It was expected that large structures having shelter value would be built as underground parking garages or other revenue-producing enterprises. Except for a few hospitals and civil-defense control centers, no loan assistance was sought or provided under this part of the act.

Although the law was not explicit on the point, the FCDA early took the administrative position that no Federal contributions would be made to States for shelter construction unless these would be public shelters. However, Federal grants, like the loan feature, have remained a dead letter. The Congress provided no funds for helping the States build shelters.

The fledgling Federal Civil Defense Administration soon abandoned any concept of large deep community shelters. The first FCDA Administrator, Millard Caldwell, in his appearance before the House Appropriations Committee on March 16, 1951, told that group that the prospects for such a shelter program were dimmed by these obstacles: There would not be adequate warning time to get people into the shelters; it would take too long to construct them; they would consume too much labor and critical materials, steel and concrete (this was during the Korean war).

Therefore, new emphasis must be put on making the most out of whatever we have wherever we find it, identifying those places that are relatively safe such as the basements of reinforced concrete buildings, and then identifying those places which can be made fairly safe by shoring up. They are available now. We cannot wait for the deep-shelter program.

SHELTER SURVEY PROGRAM: 1951-52

Having assured the Appropriations Committees that FCDA did not propose to invest shelter funds in a program of "deep holes in the ground," Administrator Caldwell later outlined three phases of the shelter program he favored: (1) Surveys in target cities to identify existing buildings which were suitable for shelter; (2) minor altera-

tions, where appropriate, to make additional buildings suitable for shelter; and (3) technical assistance by FCDA for the building of a limited number of group shelters in those areas where skilled industrial personnel have absolutely no shelter in case of attack.

It was indicated that the revised shelter program, spread over a 3-year period, would amount to \$865 million in Federal contributions. Of this, \$190 million would be devoted to modification of existing structures. Surveys and the identifying of existing safe structures to house 2 or 3 million people in critical target areas would cost \$6½ million.

Unsuccessful in obtaining congressional funds for matching shelter grants to the States, the next year Administrator Caldwell announced that shelter surveys would be completed in major cities, and matching funds granted to the States for minor modifications of existing structures to provide shelter for more than 15 million people. He restated his proposal for a 3-phase shelter program: (1) Engineering surveys to locate and mark adequate existing shelter and to identify buildings which could be made adequate by practical modifications; (2) completion of the modifications indicated by the surveys; (3) construction of simple group shelters—not mass shelters—to meet the deficiency.

Administrator Caldwell proposed \$250 million in Federal funds during 1952 to be matched by State and local contributions. The shelter program was described as essentially the same as the preceding year's, for which the same amount had been requested and rejected by the Congress. The estimate of \$250 million he regarded as a minimum, to cover the first and second phases, providing shelter for an estimated 15 million people. He acknowledged that the figure was "more or less arbitrary."

EVALUATION BY PROJECT EAST RIVER

In July 1952 (still in the "nominal" bomb era) the proposed shelter program was reviewed by Project East River as part of a comprehensive inquiry into civil defense sponsored jointly by FCDA, NSRB, and DOD.⁴⁹ Project East River considered that FCDA's total projected costs of \$1.8 billion for shelters (half to be financed by the States), as worked out with the help of Lehigh University, probably were excessive. On the basis of Boston and New York surveys, Project East River believed that minor modifications could be made in existing buildings at a cost of \$5 per person or about \$1 per square foot of shelter space. Use of existing structures was emphasized; massive communal centers were opposed. The lifesaving potential of shelters was put at 75 percent.

Project East River recommended that the FCDA-sponsored survey of shelters in existing structures be completed and that—

a study should be made of the cost and feasibility of a comprehensive shelter program to provide a reasonable level of protection for those within vulnerable urban districts.

Little was said in the Project East River report about evacuation as a civil-defense measure. A great deal of emphasis was placed on industry and population dispersion to reduce urban vulnerability.

⁴⁹ Reduction of Urban Vulnerability, pt. 5 of the report of Project East River, July 1952, pp. 15, 52, 88, 90.

CONTINUED SHELTER SURVEYS: 1953

By the time Val Peterson took office as Administrator of FCDA on February 20, 1953, the "nominal" bomb era was receding; hydrogen bombs were in the offing, and intercontinental range missiles were a larger gleam in the eyes of weapon specialists. The fallout hazard was still below the threshold of public attention and concern.

On paper, the shelter program remained as it was: Protection for people in critical target cities, with emphasis on the use of existing buildings for shelter.

In his annual report for 1953, Administrator Peterson noted that 56 cities in critical target areas had started shelter surveys in their congested commercial areas, and several were extending these surveys to include the whole State. Preliminary results of shelter surveys in some of the major target cities suggested to him that with a 15-minute warning period in commercial areas, 45 percent of the people could find reasonably safe shelter in existing facilities, 21 percent could be accommodated in facilities that were modified, and new facilities would be needed to shelter the remaining 34 percent.⁵⁰

While duly reporting on shelter planning and surveys, Administrator Peterson had no confidence in the public shelter approach. In mid-1953 he made it known to the House Appropriations Committee that he heartily endorsed their refusal to vote funds for a mass-shelter program. He suggested that families and individuals build their own shelters. He would abandon the "repeated requests" of his predecessor for \$250 million to start a program for "large public shelters." As far as he was concerned:⁵¹

The vast improvement in the destructive power of nuclear weapons would turn such public shelters into deathtraps in the large cities. Our research in this whole public shelter area is inadequate and too incomplete at this time for me to ask you to invest that kind of money in large public shelters.

With 15 minutes warning time only to be counted upon and no shelter progress, public or private in sight, "duck and cover" was the only civil defense measure. In case of attack, people would have to throw themselves under a desk or table or whatever immediate cover was in reach.

SHIFT TO EVACUATION PLANNING: 1954

"The alternatives," Administrator Peterson said in his 1954 report, "are to dig, die, or get out; and certainly we don't want to die."⁵² Since digging seemed too costly, unsafe, and unsuitable, Administrator Peterson decided that people had better "get out." Evacuation became the planning concept and main preoccupation of FCDA.

Warning time was still a troubling factor. For evacuation to work, 4 to 6 hours of advance warning might be necessary. Rather than wait until such warning could be assured, Administrator Peterson

⁵⁰ Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1953 Annual Report, p. 127.

⁵¹ Quoted in H. Rept. 2946, 84th Cong., 2d sess., p. 87.

⁵² Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1954 Annual Report, p. 8.

said, "prudent foresight" demanded that evacuation planning get underway at once.⁵³

By late 1954 the ominous shadow of the fallout hazard had cast its pall over the land. On March 1 of that year a powerful thermonuclear device was tested at Bikini Atoll. The explosion, close to the surface of a coral island, caused fallout contamination of an area exceeding 7,000 square miles. Caught in the danger area created by a sudden change of wind direction were some 250 persons, including native Marshallese, a small number of American servicemen, and a boatload of Japanese fishermen. By September 1954, bits of information were released, but the Atomic Energy Commission made no official announcement until February 1955.⁵⁴ The FCDA Administrator reported at the close of 1955:⁵⁵

The advent of the thermonuclear weapon, with its terrifically augmented power of destruction and dangerous fallout, capable of reaching hundreds of miles from a target area, brought virtually the entire country into the civil defense picture and called for wholesale revision of Federal, State, and local civil defense planning. The year 1955 was mainly given this task.

Although the new-found fallout hazard virtually sounded the death knell for evacuation planning on FCDA's assumptions, and raised in new form the need for a shelter program, Administrator Peterson was unchanged in his course. He obtained appropriations from the Congress for "survival plan" studies based on the premise of evacuation, and these studies continued for several years. FCDA entered into written contracts with the States and provided funds for State-employed project staffs.

Altogether some \$12.8 million in Federal funds were expended on this program, with uneven results and the built-in basic flaw of evacuation-oriented planning. Survival plan projects served mainly as a means to provide State and local civil defense organizations with the wherewithal for salary and administrative expenses until the law could be changed to directly authorize such Federal outlays.⁵⁶

PROPOSED SHELTER PROGRAM: 1956

Spurred by the 1956 hearings and report of this committee, which sharply criticized the overemphasis on evacuation and the neglect of shelter planning, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator drew up a "national shelter program" and submitted it to President Eisenhower on December 21, 1956. No details of the program were made public. Later, the FCDA's chief of research and development, Gerald Gallagher, told the subcommittee that what his agency proposed "was

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ In its 1956 report, the committee criticized the belated release of fallout information, the incomplete and misleading nature of the information, the playing down of hazards by resort to global averages and other minimizing assumptions, the excessive optimism about genetic effects, and the release of information in dribs and drabs through highly technical speeches and hypothetical discussions. See H. Rept. 2946, 86th Cong., 2d sess., p. 12. The Atomic Energy Commission's 1958 Annual Report to the Congress states (p. 240): "On fallout and its possible consequences, the Commission constantly makes new information available as rapidly as possible * * *."

⁵⁵ Federal Civil Defense Administration, 1955 Annual Report, p. 1.

⁵⁶ Public Law 85-606, approved Aug. 8, 1958 (72 Stat. 532; 50 U.S.C. App. 2251 ff.), authorized Federal funds on a matching basis to help pay costs of personnel and administration in State and local civil defense organizations.

essentially a combination of 30 pounds per square inch [blast] shelters and fallout shelters.”⁵⁷

In view of the economic and international implications of a national shelter program, the FCDA proposal was referred to the National Security Council and studied by interested Government agencies. It became an “input” to the Gaither Committee, which President Eisenhower called upon to study civil defense in the broad context of active and passive defense strategy and relationships.⁵⁸ Although the Gaither report still remains a secret, it is commonly known that the group endorsed a civil defense shelter program.

“NATIONAL SHELTER POLICY”: 1958

In May 1958, about 1½ years after the FCDA’s proposed shelter program was referred to the President, the new Administrator, Leo A. Hoegh, took the occasion of our civil defense hearings to announce the administration’s “national shelter policy.” The policy favored: (1) Fallout shelters only; (2) private (non-Federal) construction; (3) Federal assistance in the form of information, research, construction of prototypes, and incorporation of shelters in existing and new Federal buildings. Administrator Hoegh made it clear that “there will be no massive federally financed shelter construction program.”⁵⁹

Seven months later, in December 1958, Administrator Hoegh issued “the national shelter plan” as annex 10 of “the national plan for civil defense and defense mobilization.” The annex was essentially a rewrite of the objectives previously outlined to the subcommittee. The Federal Government would provide “stimulation, leadership, guidance, and example.” Upon the States and local governments and private property owners would fall the burdens of actually providing shelter protection.

Examining the results of this program 2 years later, the committee reported in July 1960:⁶⁰

In the 2 years since announcement of the “national shelter plan,” few tangible achievements can be found. There is no plan in the sense of a schedule of performance on which milestones of achievement can be identified and slippages or accelerations measured. Despite the expenditure of considerable funds by OCDM in an education and information program, and despite Governor Hoegh’s energetic efforts and numerous field trips and public appearances, comparatively few shelters of any description have been constructed in the United States.

For the fiscal years 1960 and 1961 the Congress appropriated \$5 million (\$2.5 million each year) for the Federal portion of the shelter program. Of this total amount, approximately \$4.3 million was earmarked for prototype shelters and \$700,000 for shelter surveys.

⁵⁷ Civil Defense, hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives, 85th Cong., 2d sess., April–May 1958, p. 99.

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 96–97.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 393–395.

⁶⁰ H. Rept. 2069, 86th Cong., 2d sess., p. 7.

PROTOTYPE SHELTERS

The allocations for prototypes contemplated 935 shelters, comprising 256 family-type, 79 group or community-type, and 600 in high schools. Included in the family-type were 29 fallout shelters which OCDM proposed to construct on the campuses of 29 land-grant colleges. The 600 high school shelters would be constructed by their vocational departments under OCDM guidance, the Federal incentive being \$250, which OCDM would pay to each of the 600 high schools undertaking shelter construction.

As of June 30, 1961, OCDM reported the status of the prototype shelter program as follows: Family fallout shelters—135 completed, 61 more in various stages of completion, 18 others approved, and 1 under negotiation. Community fallout shelters—5 completed, 58 under construction, and 13 more approved. Under the high school program 453 contracts had been signed and 160 shelters actually constructed.

SHELTERS IN EXISTING FEDERAL BUILDINGS

Fallout shelters in existing Federal buildings were to be handled through General Services Administration funding. This program had completely negative results. The GSA was only halfhearted, and the Appropriations Committees were adamantly opposed because of the lack of explicit statutory authorization.⁶¹ Under OCDM direction, the GSA initially studied 10 Federal buildings to determine their fallout shielding potential, found 5 to have promise, but obtained no funds.

For fiscal year 1960 the General Services Administration requested \$2 million to modify existing buildings. This sum was not appropriated by the Congress. A similar request in fiscal year 1961 likewise was turned down. And for fiscal year 1962, the House Committee on Appropriations, in reducing from \$60 million to \$58 million the funds requested for repair and improvement of public buildings, reported:

The committee has again disallowed the request for \$2 million to make alterations to existing buildings to provide fallout shelters.⁶²

The Senate Committee on Appropriations seconded the disallowance.⁶³

SHELTERS FOR NEW FEDERAL BUILDINGS

Fallout shelters for new Federal buildings fared hardly better than for existing buildings.

On September 29, 1958, OCDM issued a directive to the heads of all nonmilitary departments and agencies in pursuance of the announced policy that fallout shelters would be incorporated in new Federal buildings. The OCDM paper directed all agencies to include in budget estimates for new Federal buildings, beginning with fiscal

⁶¹ See, for example, Independent Offices Appropriations for 1961, hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 86th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 2, pp. 85–86. The 12 Federal Reserve banks and their 24 branches, which do not depend on appropriated funds, have shelter modification programs in being or underway.

⁶² H. Rept. 449, 87th Cong., 1st sess., p. 9.

⁶³ S. Rept. 620, 87th Cong., 1st sess., p. 13.

year 1962, additional sums of money for fallout shelters. OCDM criteria in design would be followed, but shelter design responsibilities were left to the building agencies. A revised OCDM directive of February 4, 1959, amplified the standards and criteria.

In the fiscal year 1960 budget estimates, funds were requested for only one project, an addition to a National Bureau of Standards laboratory building in Boulder, Colo. In the funds appropriated for construction of the laboratory addition, \$90,000 was included for the incorporation of a fallout shelter.

During fiscal year 1961, in compliance with the OCDM directive, requests totaling \$13,490,000 were included in budget estimates, of which only \$435,000 was granted. This included \$375,000 for shelter in another National Bureau of Standards building to be constructed at Gaithersburg, Md., and \$60,000 to the Department of Interior for shelter in a National Park Service building to be constructed in Washington, D.C. OCDM would review the shelter designs prior to construction.

For fiscal year 1962, the House Appropriations Committee approved \$171,600,000, to include 20 major and several minor public building projects. However, the appropriation bill specifically disallowed funds for installing fallout shelters in these projects.⁶⁴ The Senate committee agreed, but softened the blow by saying it wanted—

to review the matter in connection with the pending reorganization of civil defense activities in the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization.⁶⁵

PILOT SURVEY PROGRAM

The fallout shelter survey program, for which \$700,000 was earmarked in fiscal year 1961 funds, called for one survey in each State. In this way, OCDM hoped to train local personnel and develop some capability in each State for completing surveys of their remaining areas. The objectives were broadly to determine (1) the extent to which existing buildings, mines, tunnels, caves, and other structures could be used as fallout shelters; and (2) modifications, equipment, and supplies required to make them serve as adequate shelters.

Five pilot surveys had been completed by the end of fiscal year 1960. These covered Montgomery, city and county, Ala.; Tulsa, Okla.; Contra Costa County, Calif.; Charleston, city and county, W. Va.; and Jefferson City, Mo. (An earlier 1956 survey was made in Wisconsin.)

Five additional surveys were negotiated, including a second phase of a Milwaukee survey and a special survey of apartment houses in Kansas City.

The 1961 fund allocations provided for surveys in the capital cities of 23 States. Contracts were signed with 8 States, and negotiations started with 15 more. OCDM estimated that \$500,000 would be required in fiscal year 1962 to complete surveys in the remaining States.

⁶⁴ H. Rept. 449, 87th Cong., 1st sess., p. 10.
⁶⁵ S. Rept. 620, 87th Cong., 1st sess., p. 18.

V. THE NEW SHELTER PROGRAM

In what manner does the new civil defense shelter program announced by President Kennedy and outlined to the subcommittee by Secretary McNamara, differ from that of the preceding administration? There is no radical departure in civil defense doctrine or concept but a decided shift in coverage, agency jurisdiction, magnitude of funding, and degree of Federal participation.

Still confining itself to fallout shelters, the program emphasizes the largest number of shelters to be obtained in the quickest time at the least cost. Consequently, it is directed to finding suitable fallout shelter space in existing structures, making improvements where appropriate, and stocking the shelters with emergency supplies. Federal funds will be spent for these purposes. In this sense it is a public shelter program, although privately owned as well as public buildings will be surveyed, marked, and equipped. There is little or no mention, in the President's program, of family fallout shelters or do-it-yourself programs.⁶⁶

In summary, the major differences characterizing the new shelter program are reflected in the decisions (1) to assign fallout shelter functions to the Department of Defense; (2) to embark upon a nationwide Federal program of identifying and marking available community shelter space in existing buildings throughout the United States; (3) to stock these shelter spaces with federally procured emergency rations, water, and monitoring and other equipment, and (4) to undertake some limited improvements, starting with existing Federal structures, to expand the occupancy potentials.

BUDGET ESTIMATES

The new emphasis on the fallout shelter program is suggested by the fact that of the \$207.6 million requested by President Kennedy for the civil defense work of the Department of Defense, \$169.3 million or 83 percent is earmarked for shelter survey and marking of existing structures, improvements where appropriate, shelters in new Federal buildings, and equipment and supplies for making shelters usable.

The breakdown of the Department of Defense budget request for civil defense functions in fiscal year 1962 is as follows:⁶⁷

⁶⁶ In his July 25, 1961, address to the American people, President Kennedy included this remark: "In the coming months, I hope to let every citizen know what steps he can take without delay, to protect his family in case of attack." In testimony before the subcommittee, Secretary McNamara stated that additional action would be required to provide home shelters, but he was not yet prepared to say in what form or by what methods of financing. 1961 hearings, p. 20.

⁶⁷ 1961 hearings, p. 131.

<i>Item</i>	<i>Budget request (millions)</i>
Shelter program:	
Survey and marking	\$93.0
Improvements of existing shelter space	10.0
Shelters in new Federal construction	7.5
Equipment and supplies	58.8
Food (dry survival rations, 5-year shelf life)	(27.8)
Water	(7.5)
Tools	(1.0)
Sanitation	(4.2)
Medical and first aid	(15.3)
Radiological detection kits	(2.0)
Secure storage	(1.0)
Warning and detection:	
NEAR system	10.0
Warning and alert and emergency operations	5.5
Radiological detection	9.3
Research and development	13.5
Total, civil defense	207.6

Additionally, the President requested supplemental appropriations of \$73.2 million for the Departments of Agriculture and Health, Education, and Welfare for purposes of relocating Government-owned wheat supplies and procuring additional medical supplies for the emergency hospital program.⁶⁸

Other civil defense funds will be transferred to the Department of Defense from OCDM when determinations have been made finally on the transfer of personnel and facilities. For fiscal year 1962 OCDM received \$86.5 million.⁶⁹

These requests, aggregating \$367.3 million, if granted in whole will be the equivalent of almost 60 percent of the funds appropriated, or almost 70 percent of the Federal funds actually spent, for civil defense purposes in the 11-year period 1951 through 1961.⁷⁰

THE SHELTER SURVEY PROGRAM: 1961-62

In the fallout shelter identification and marking program, approximately 34 million spaces will be identified and marked during fiscal year 1962. The total program, involving an estimated 50 million spaces, is scheduled for completion in December 1962.⁷¹

According to present estimates, as shown in the above table, shelter survey and marking will account for almost half (\$93 million) of the \$207.6 million civil defense budget approved for the Department of Defense.

Going far beyond OCDM-sponsored sample State surveys to develop local capabilities, the Department of Defense proposes to conduct a nationwide technical "census" of fallout shelter spaces in existing structures, utilizing professional architect-engineer firms. Contracting agencies will be the Army Corps of Engineers and, where more convenient, the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks.

⁶⁸ H. Doc. 224, 87th Cong., 1st sess. The request was submitted Aug. 14, 1961. On Sept. 12, 1961, the House Committee on Appropriations recommended that the \$47,200,000 request for the wheat relocation program be denied and the \$26 million for medical supplies be reduced to \$13 million. H. Rept. 1175, 87th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 2, 4.

⁶⁹ Public Law 87-141 (75 Stat. 342), approved Aug. 17, 1961.

⁷⁰ Statistical data on Federal civil defense requests, appropriations, and expenditures, for the period 1951 through 1961, are printed in the 1961 hearings, app. 9, p. 396.

⁷¹ 1961 hearings, pp. 7, 117.

Training program

A 4-week crash training program for instructors to guide and supervise the contract surveys was promptly instituted at the U.S. Army Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, Va. The first contingent of approximately 120 instructors, mainly civilian engineers employed by the Army and Navy, graduated from the training school on September 1, 1961. Several members of the subcommittee and staff attended the graduating ceremonies and were impressed by the serious interest shown in civil defense and by the makeup of the training curriculum.

According to Department of Defense information, these instructors will train 1,000 supervisory personnel of architect-engineer firms, who in turn will train their own field engineers, possibly numbering 10,000, for shelter survey work.⁷²

Contract management

Contracts will be awarded to qualified architect-engineer firms. These contracts will be managed by existing district offices of the Army Corps of Engineers and local public works offices of the Navy Bureau of Yards and Docks. The 38 Army and 12 Navy district offices are distributed throughout the United States. It is expected that the field office (Army or Navy) for each State will coordinate the administration of all contracts for surveys within that State. The contract form will be a standard document used by both the Army and Navy. Prospective contractors will be required to demonstrate that their key personnel are professional engineers, registered to practice in their particular field, and that members of the survey teams are technically qualified to collect and evaluate survey data.⁷³

The decision to use professional architect-engineer firms undoubtedly will bring about speedier and more uniform technical results than the alternative of training and utilizing local civil defense organizations or volunteer personnel. At the same time, the subcommittee does not regard the Department's approach as an unmixed blessing. A sizable portion of the funds will be absorbed in fees and overhead expenses and inevitably there will be some duplication, uneven performance, and unessential work. This is a new field of endeavor, and it has many uncertainties.

Test surveys

The better part of wisdom, it would seem, is to run one or more projects for testing instruction methods and contractor performance, so that the lessons may be quickly applied in extending the program. The committee is advised that test surveys will be run in Baltimore, Md.; Washington, D.C.; and White Plains, N.Y.

The primary objective in the first run of surveys should be to learn how to assimilate data already available and to avoid amassing data not highly essential in present or future shelter programs. The present program offers limited protection at best. Dollars should be expended to gather basic information for expanding the potentials of shelter protection rather than to achieve technical perfection in a limited program.

⁷² 1961 hearings, p. 113
⁷³ Ibid.

It is the committee's understanding that priority schedules will be established in the comprehensive survey, based upon computer estimates of the areas of greatest fallout risk associated with given attack patterns. This is in keeping with the concept of getting the most protection in the quickest time per dollar expended. The subcommittee urges the Department of Defense to make every effort to minimize unnecessary costs and to produce timely results in the shelter identification and marking program.

STOCKING THE SHELTER SPACES

As shelter spaces are identified and marked, they will be stocked with necessary supplies and equipment. Secretary McNamara described these measures as the "heart of the President's program."⁷⁴

The sum of \$58.8 million is allotted in fiscal year 1962 for stockage. This amount will supply an estimated 30 million spaces. The remaining 20 million of the 50 million spaces expected to be identified and marked, will be stocked in fiscal year 1963 at a cost of \$2 per space, or \$40 million. Thus, the total stockage cost of \$98.8 million is in the same range of estimate as \$93 million for the identification and marking program.

Rations and supplies

According to Secretary McNamara, only shelter spaces available and accessible to the public will be stocked.⁷⁵ These will have a 5-day "austere emergency ration" and a 2-week's supply of water at the rate of 1 quart per person per day packaged in special containers. Water is considered more essential for survival than food.

The food ration will have a minimum shelf-life of 5 years, will be inexpensive, easily prepared, and adapted to the shelter conditions of restricted water and heat. If necessary, the 5-day ration will have to be stretched for longer periods of consumption.

Radiation-measuring instruments, essential sanitation equipment, supplies, and simple tools also will be stored in the shelter spaces, with special arrangements, where necessary, to safeguard storage of supplies.

Food reserves

A corollary food program, for which the President requested \$47,-200,000, involves Department of Agriculture relocation of 126 million bushels of Government-owned wheat. These reserves would be moved from present storage sites, largely in production areas, to consuming areas where postattack food shortages might be anticipated.

A White House announcement explained that the stock would be relocated close to 191 metropolitan areas, with a total population of 95 million, thereby making available three-fourths of a pound of wheat per person per day over a 4-month period. The statement said this was the first specific proposal for emergency food stockpiling which has been developed in the executive branch. While further studies might indicate the need for additional food stockpiling measures, this

⁷⁴ 1961 hearings, p. 7.
⁷⁵ 1961 hearings, pp. 8, 17.

program was reported as a major first step which can be quickly taken.⁷⁶

Significant developments leading to the proposed food research program were outlined in a statement submitted to the subcommittee by OCDM Director Ellis.⁷⁷ It appears from this summary that OCDM proposals for inclusion of feed grains and ready-to-eat foods in the relocation program have been deferred by the Department of Agriculture pending further study.

Processed food

A committee on food rations, established by Governor Morrison of Nebraska, recommends that the emergency food stockpile program being developed by the Department of Agriculture should be expanded to include processing of grain reserves into emergency survival rations.⁷⁸ We are inclined to agree. Storage of raw grain in strategic areas has distinct limitations, since the grain is not directly edible and the processing of grain for use after an attack would be difficult at best.

While the wheat redistribution program apparently contemplates new storage adjacent to processing plants in metropolitan areas, first emphasis in emergency food preparedness should be given to food supplies which will not depend on the uncertain possibilities of immediate processing after an attack.

A Department of Agriculture program for processing wheat supplies into ready-to-eat foods could be integrated with the Department of Defense shelter provisioning program. There is no good reason for competitive food ration procurement programs.

Provisioning problem

The committee calls attention to an excellent study, "Food Supply for Fallout Shelters," prepared for OCDM by the Western Utilization Research and Development Division of the Agricultural Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, printed in the 1961 hearings as appendix 10. This study shows the complexities of the food rationing problem, suggests needed areas for research, and sets forth basic ration concepts, upon which Secretary McNamara drew in preparing his testimony.

It is important that food be palatable, have a shelf-life of 5 to 10 years, be low in cost, be packaged in bulk for minimum storage space, be easily prepared and served, and produce very little trash volume. In sum, a special survival ration will be required, tailored to shelter requirements.

The general run of commercially prepared foods will meet few or none of the basic ration concepts. For use in a federally financed public shelter program they will be too high in cost, too complex to prepare and serve, too difficult to store, and too short in shelf-life.

⁷⁶ White House release accompanying Executive Order 10958, Aug. 14, 1961, printed in 1961 hearings as app. 4B, p. 385. See also H. Doc. 224, 87th Cong., 1st sess., The House Committee on Appropriations recommended on Sept. 12, 1961, that the funds be denied because the proposal "deserves further study." It noted that \$27.8 million already had been appropriated for shelter rations. H. Rept. 1175, 87th Cong., 1st sess., p. 2.

⁷⁷ 1961 hearings, app. 7, p. 390.

⁷⁸ The report of the Governor's committee is printed in the 1961 hearings as app. 11, p. 500.

IMPROVEMENTS IN EXISTING SHELTER SPACES

The fallout shelter program for fiscal year 1962 includes a \$10-million pilot project to test ways of modifying shelter spaces. One objective is to upgrade shelter spaces to meet minimum criteria for protection; another, and more important one, is to increase occupancy in a given amount of shelter space.

Secretary McNamara explained that it would not be necessary to wait upon the completion of the shelter survey before beginning work on shelter modification as well as plans for dual-purpose shelter space in new buildings. The pilot modification program will be confined to existing Federal buildings in order to avoid problems of ownership and control.⁷⁹

Physical modification of structures, it seems, will play a small part in the fallout shelter program. Structural changes in existing buildings are expensive, difficult to put into effect, and require money outlays which would quickly run into cost ranges competitive with new shelter construction designed especially for fallout protection. New construction of shelters is not part of the present program.

The biggest payoff in the shelter improvement program is seen in modifying the equipment (primarily ventilation) rather than the structures. Department of Defense officials are impressed with the possibilities of forced draft ventilation, operating from standby powerplants, which would enable many more persons to occupy existing shelter spaces.⁸⁰

Expansion potentials for existing shelter spaces will be better known, of course, after data come in from the survey and pilot modification programs. An OCDM analyst, John Devaney, offered these estimates: Feasible improvements in existing buildings would increase the fallout shelter spaces from 40 or 50 million to 75 million, with modification costs on the order of \$1.5 billion.⁸¹

While the fiscal year 1962 program of the Department of Defense makes no commitment for a modification program of this magnitude, the survey is expected to yield the necessary data. When asked why the Department had earmarked \$93 million for survey and marking, when OCDM had figured \$50 million for the job, witnesses from both agencies said that the lower estimate did not take into account the data-gathering requirements for modification.⁸²

SHELTERS IN NEW FEDERAL BUILDINGS

For new Federal buildings, the 1962 budget provides \$7.5 million to cover the additional cost of planning and constructing fallout shelters. The Department hopes that architectural plans can be developed to reduce considerably incremental cost estimates for providing fallout shelters in new buildings, and that these plans will serve as an incentive for incorporation of fallout shelters in State and local government buildings, other public buildings, schools, and offices.⁸³

⁷⁹ 1961 hearings, p. 7.

⁸⁰ 1961 hearings, p. 7.

⁸¹ 1961 hearings, p. 85.

⁸² 1961 hearings, pp. 101-102.

⁸³ 1961 hearings, p. 7.

We noted above that the OCDM program for incorporating fallout shelters in existing and new Federal buildings had made practically no headway in the face of Appropriations Committee opposition. Appropriation act language banning General Services Administration expenditures for fallout shelters in Federal buildings does not apply specifically to funds appropriated to the Department of Defense. Presumably the Department of Defense will execute agreements with the General Services Administration and supply funds for incorporating fallout shelters in Federal buildings. Budget Director Bell advised the subcommittee that the funding arrangements for this portion of the fallout shelter program were still under study.⁸⁴

SHELTER-RELATED MEASURES

The remainder of the Department's fiscal year 1962 program for civil defense is directed to warning and detection (\$24.8 million) and research and development (\$13.5 million).

The problem of warning, Secretary McNamara explained, is not so urgent for fallout shelters as for shelter against blast or other direct weapon effects. While larger particles of contaminated dust and debris would fall to earth rather quickly in the blast damage area, lighter particles would travel with the winds and be precipitated some hours later. In the 1954 Bikini explosion mentioned earlier, 10 hours elapsed before the contaminated particles began to fall at the extremities of the 7,000 square mile area.⁸⁵ The fallout hazard, for a large part of the population, affords time for protective action.

Attack warning

The attack warning system, as developed by military and civil agencies of Government, starts with information received directly at the Headquarters of the North American Air Defense Command. Warning information is flashed to OCDM regional warning centers, designated Federal agencies, and civilian warning points located mainly in State and city police offices. The States and other political entities are responsible for disseminating warnings to all local communities and rural areas. Outdoor siren systems are depended on for the most part to alert the citizenry.

It is now widely recognized that the siren system has "serious drawbacks," as Secretary McNamara said, in warning the general public. Most people are indoors at any given time, and sirens cannot always be heard. Sometimes the warning is delayed, or the equipment breaks down.

Home warning system

OCDM has investigated various home-warning devices and has sponsored development of the national emergency alarm repeater (NEAR) system. This system requires special generating equipment in electrical substations throughout the country for sending signals to homes and offices over powerlines.

The \$5.5 million earmarked by the Department of Defense for the NEAR program, Secretary McNamara stated to the subcommittee,

⁸⁴ 1961 hearings, app. 5, p. 387.

⁸⁵ "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," prepared by the Department of Defense, published by the Atomic Energy Commission, June 1957, p. 28.

will be "a good start on the installation of a home warning system."⁸⁶ He proposes, if the Michigan test of the NEAR system "proves successful," to begin nationwide installation of the generator equipment, expected to cost about \$50 million. This generator equipment would be procured with Federal funds. Home receivers (plug-in devices) which would alert occupants by a distinctive warning noise, would be produced commercially and sold to the general public at a cost of \$5 to \$10 each.

Other measures

The Department of Defense program also includes initial funding to provide fallout protection and standby power for some 1,300 broadcasting stations which will be depended upon for transmitting emergency information to the public; to provide backup radio communications for wire line links between these stations and local and regional civil defense headquarters; and to improve the national warning system. Also, radiation detection kits for some 90,000 monitoring stations will be provided, in addition to the 50,000 already equipped; and aerial monitoring equipment and individual detection meters for use in decontamination and rescue work will be purchased.

Research and development

The \$13.5 million earmarked for research and development in the Department's fiscal year 1962 civil defense program is more than half the total amount spent by OCDM for such purposes over a 11-year period. Secretary McNamara recognizes the importance of research and development in civil defense for ultimate time- and money-saving accomplishments. The committee believes that the research and development effort should be substantially increased, not only for meeting immediate needs ahead, but to anticipate the developing requirements of a longer range civil defense program.

To date, research and development funds for civil defense have been stinted. Missile and other new defense technologies should be able to make many valuable contributions to the technical side of civil defense.

In defining research tasks, care should be taken to avoid trivial and peripheral projects which become overintellectualized excursions of investigators anxious to relate their own disciplines to a new subject. We suggest below (sec. VI) some of the needed research areas in a national civil defense program.

LIFESAVING POTENTIALS OF NEW PROGRAM

The survey program to identify fallout shelters in existing structures would, according to Secretary McNamara, identify 50 million usable shelter spaces and provide "a minimum of shelter" for about one-fourth of the American population. He explained that 50 million spaces would not mean 50 million lives saved, since casualty estimates from a hypothetical nuclear attack attributed 75 percent of the deaths to blast, thermal, and prompt radiation effects. Attack patterns could vary, of course, and so the lifesaving potential of fallout shelters would vary with the numbers of persons exposed to the fallout hazard alone. All in all, Secretary McNamara believed that it was reasonable

⁸⁶ 1961 hearings, pp. 8-9.

to suppose that, if a thermonuclear attack came, the fallout shelter program would "save at least 10 to 15 million lives."⁸⁷

Loose arithmetic

The arithmetic, we must observe, is extremely loose. Not only are the extrapolations made from very meager data, but the assumptions necessarily vary with the attack pattern. Whether the enemy decides to strike military targets only, or major metropolitan areas, or both; whether the assumed attack bears a 1961, or 1965, or 1970 date and therefore carries different assumptions as to total weapon yield and accuracy; whether nuclear bombs are exploded in the air, or on or near the ground; all make considerable differences in the arithmetic.

Until the survey is accomplished, 50 million spaces in a shelter identification and marking program are a "talking" figure. It might be 40 million, or 60 million, or some other figure. And so with the estimates of lifesaving potential. The Secretary suggests 10 to 15 million lives can be saved; others have mentioned figures ranging from 5 to 35 million. There are many variables in the calculus of survival.

The lifesaving potential of fallout shelters, whatever the estimates, refers to their incremental value for survival. That is to say, fallout shelters are valued for the protection they would give those who survive the blast and thermal effects but are exposed to lethal fallout radiation. A fallout shelter program could be rated on other values, such as reduction in human dosage or in shelter-stay time, but the life-saving potential generally is offered as the primary justification.

In the hypothetical attack mentioned by Secretary McNamara, 50 million Americans would have died and 125 million would have survived, although 20 million of these would have been seriously injured.⁸⁸ Many millions would have been exposed to no serious hazards, fallout or otherwise. Other millions would have been saved and protected from significant injury by taking available shelter. Possibly 12 or 13 million would have died from fallout radiation.

The fallout shelter program is directed toward the last group. Many would have been saved by knowing where to go, the life-saving potential varying with the adequacy of the shelter program and the assumed level of attack.

If there were no fallout shelter program as such, we might expect that in case of attack the people would take shelter wherever they could—in basements or other building interiors. This "random sheltering" would have important, even though limited, protection value against fallout. The new program cannot take credit for this increment in life-saving potentials.

Better-than-random shelters

What the survey and marking program does is identify the *best* shelter space available and point (by signs) the way to get there. The improvement program, by providing more ventilation, possibly by some structural modification, allows more persons to occupy the best spaces. By these means, the new fallout shelter program improves

⁸⁷ 1961 hearings, p. 7.

⁸⁸ This hypothetical attack pattern was drawn up under Mr. Holifield's direction as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Radiation, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. See "Biological and Environmental Effects of Nuclear War, Summary-Analysis of Hearings," June 22-26, 1959, Joint Committee print, August 1959.

the protection factor and effects a more "rational," or better than random, distribution of the sheltered population. This increment in life-saving potentials can be credited to the new fallout shelter program.

While the net contribution of the identification, marking, and improvement program can be better evaluated after the complete survey findings are in, it must be realized that the potentials at best are limited. All deaths from fallout can be prevented—but not in existing buildings, even when improved. Nationwide, the largest number of structures do not afford even the bare minimum protection factor considered necessary to bring the radiation hazard down to tolerable levels. All that the new program can hope to do is find those corners in the Nation's physical plant, so to speak, which will allow a few more millions to survive. We do not mean to deprecate this achievement, only to point out its limited nature.

Shelter location

Building densities impose additional handicaps. Patterns of acceptable shelter capacity in existing structures will vary by city and region. On the assumption that the greatest capacity is in downtown areas of large cities, the fallout shelter program has been criticized as seeking fallout protection in the areas most likely to be destroyed by blast and thermal effects. Also, considering the large out-movement of city workers and shoppers at the close of each workday, questions have been raised as to accessibility to the shelters in case of a night attack.

The rejoinder is that enemy attack patterns are not invariant. In the immediate years ahead, the enemy may not have enough nuclear weapons for all the metropolitan targets; he may decide to attack only missile or bomber bases. And, even with a plenitude of attacking weapons, these will not necessarily be delivered with pinpoint accuracy, so that some areas of heavy population may escape direct hits.⁸⁹

The present fallout shelter program is based on the supposition not only that there are many uncertainties which could work in favor of increasing the number of survivors, but that by identification and marking we take the quickest, least costly measures to expand life-saving potentials.

⁸⁹ See 1961 hearings, pp. 119 ff.

VI. CIVIL DEFENSE: 1961-65

In previous sections of this report we examined rather closely the President's May 25 message to the Congress on civil defense, the preparatory moves toward reorganization of the Federal civil defense program, the meaning of Executive Order 10952 and its impact on the Department of Defense and the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, and the components of the new civil defense program.

Restating some well-known facts, we looked back at the various organizational alignments and realignments of civil defense and defense mobilization in the intricate, ever-changing structure of the executive branch. Also we traced the evolution of what goes by the name of a national shelter policy, summarizing in that context a decade of ineffectual civil defense planning.

In reviewing the new civil defense program, we admonished the Department of Defense to gather civil defense shelter data in a timely and effective way, to avoid duplicate and unessential work, and to sift new ideas and techniques for savings in time and money.

We noted what seemed to us shortcomings of the new civil defense program, and we suggested more than once that it can be considered only the beginning of a program for national survival and recovery in the case of nuclear attack.

THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

Having looked at civil defense yesterday and today, it is well to turn toward the morrow. The President said in his message to the Congress that Federal funds for civil defense "will increase sharply in subsequent years." Secretary McNamara told the subcommittee that the \$207.6 million civil defense program request for fiscal year 1962 involved "no future commitments," except the \$40 million to complete the stockage of shelter supplies and equipment in the following fiscal year.⁹⁰

The NEAR system, if installed nationwide, would cost \$50 to \$60 million over a 3- or 4-year period, but no final decision had been made on installing the system. Other civil defense costs for the immediate future were indefinite, depending somewhat on what the States and localities would spend themselves, and on savings effected by drawing upon available resources and facilities in the defense establishment.

Decisions about future aspects of the shelter program would have to await the results of the pilot modification program and construction of shelters in Federal buildings.

The Secretary and his aides assured the subcommittee that the present program was not the sum and substance of their civil defense plans and ideas, but they held that it would be unwise to make large money and program commitments until a solid foundation of facts were laid through the national shelter survey.⁹¹

⁹⁰ 1961 hearings, p. 13.
⁹¹ 1961 hearings, pp. 106, 118-119.

The committee cannot quarrel with the factfinding so long as it is done without undue delay or excessive cost, and providing the data actually are used for drafting a comprehensive program and making systematic progress rather than for continued improvisation and patchwork efforts.

FORWARD PLANNING

For too many years the FCDA and its successor, OCDM, have projected their civil defense planning on this basis: "What were we able to do last year?" The question which the Department of Defense now must ask itself: "What is the national need and what must we do to meet it?"

Civil defense has been afflicted with too much planning to the rear. It needs forward planning—a plan and a program for the next 5 years. The heart of this program must be, of necessity, shelter protection for the American people.

In the early days of "nominal" bomb planning, when blast shelters were the primary challenge to civil defense, planning officials were heard to say: "Let's see first what we have in the way of existing shelter capacity." We hear the same advice today. Except for some rudimentary surveys, the early planners never ascertained the shelter capacity of existing structures, and their efforts were defeated by time and circumstance and new and greater weapon hazards. They did at least entertain some concept of protection for all the people. What existing shelters could not supply would be made up by new construction.

We said immediately above that we cannot quarrel with the methodology of first finding out what we have before deciding what more we need. However, if this method is to have point and meaning, it must be animated by some concept of the total national need for shelters, and therefore of the deficiencies which must be overcome by special construction if existing capacity falls short. This concept in turn will be sharpened and refined by the survey data.

AN OPTIMUM SHELTER PLAN

The Department of Defense must develop, as rapidly as possible, an optimum shelter plan for the United States.

Due consideration will have to be given to the facts that: (1) Specially designed underground shelters are much more effective against radiation than existing or adapted aboveground shelters; (2) group shelters are much more effective for survival and recovery than individual family shelters.

We do not demean nor intend to discourage family and individual measures for shelter protection. Many millions of families, however, will have neither the economic means nor the physical facilities for building their own shelters. Then we must always keep in mind that emergency operations after an attack do not stop with survival. The question, "What do we do next?", will have to be answered by purposeful directed operations leading from survival to emergence from shelters and the resumption of important recuperative tasks. As "staging areas" for recovery, group shelters make a great deal more sense than family shelters.

Data developed by the U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory justify the estimate that a carefully planned system of underground shelters, fully equipped and stocked with food and other essentials, can be provided on a nationwide basis at a cost ranging between \$50 and \$100 per person. Adopting even the higher figure and making some allowances for unanticipated costs, we have a cost estimate of \$20 billion. A sum hardly one-half a given year's outlay for military defense purposes does not seem to us to be beyond economic reason or technical achievement.

From the standpoint of protection against fallout radiation, planned location, and efficient use of national resources, a nationwide system of underground group shelters offers the most promise.

Such shelters can be more readily installed in some areas than in others, depending upon terrain, subsurface conditions, and population density. The committee anticipates that an optimum shelter plan for the United States would include the construction of many shelters of the flexible steel arch design studied by the U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory.

BLAST PROTECTION ASPECTS

An important feature of this underground shelter design is that, although primarily intended for protection against fallout radiation, it offers considerable protection against fire and blast effects. The minimum design would offer 10 pounds per square inch (p.s.i.) blast protection since the added protection can be obtained at negligible cost by a little attention to the design of entrance doors and ventilators. Even 10 p.s.i., for underground structures of this type, squeezes down considerably the range of lethal blast and fire effects.

The shelter studied by the Naval Laboratory can be given a 35-p.s.i. capability at a 15-percent increase in cost. Higher blast protection options for this structure are technically possible, but the 35-p.s.i. factor enables the structure to survive blast so close to the fireball that initial nuclear radiation becomes the greater hazard, requiring that the shelter go deeper under the earth. As more excavation is required, tunnel structures become more economical than separate shelters.

Deep underground shelter systems designed for high levels of protection against direct weapon effects would be quite a costly proposition nationwide, although the data on this subject are scanty.

In explaining to the subcommittee that the President's program "is designed to protect the American people against the dangers from fallout" Secretary McNamara added that "protection against fallout is much less expensive than protection against blast."⁹² This view dominates civil defense thinking.

The matter of expense, we may observe, is always very touchy in civil defense but hardly ever, it seems, in other defense. In terms of the defense that money will buy, protection of the civil population always is put at the bottom of the list.

In the 11 years since the Congress began appropriating funds for the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the total sum of \$620 million was made available, of which \$532 million actually was spent

⁹² 1961 hearings, p. 6.

(some appropriated funds lapsed or remained unliquidated obligations).⁹³ This sum in the aggregate is less by far than the amount spent on the Navaho weapon system, which never came into being, or on the Snark, which went into the discard after one squadron. The Nation spent three times as much for the Navaho and Snark jointly in a decade as it did for Federal civil defense.

BLAST SHELTERS VERSUS ACTIVE DEFENSE

The cost factors in blast protection for the civil population react sensitively upon military planners who must consider alternative modes of defense. Secretary McNamara stated to the subcommittee that the blast shelter program would be "somewhat competitive" with active defense systems such as the Nike-Zeus, whereas the fallout shelter is complementary to such a system.⁹⁴ Although the Secretary did not elaborate on this point, he had in mind that antimissile systems do not protect against fallout. To the extent that they are effective, they reduce blast hazards by shooting down incoming missiles. Blast shelters protect people, not property or buildings. Antimissile weapons, if they are successful, can protect both people and property.

As yet there are no perfected defenses against intercontinental missiles. A basic question is whether we gain more ultimate protection from blast effects by working and investing huge sums of money to perfect missile countermeasures, so that incoming missiles can be destroyed in flight, or whether sums of similar magnitude should be invested in blast shelters.⁹⁵ Many complex considerations enter into the analysis which we cannot detail here.

It is clear, however, that a great deal more needs to be known about the costs and effectiveness of blast shelters. In an optimum shelter program, blast protection would have to be considered not only for strategic operating centers and key Government personnel, but for concentrations of population least likely to benefit from fallout protection alone.

The competitive position of blast shelters and active defense measures suggests, at the very least, that civil defense is no longer an "outsider" to military strategic planning. The Secretary of Defense, now having conjoint responsibilities for military and civil defense will be responsible for weighing all the strategic factors. He will also, as we have suggested above, be in a position to reconcile or adjust competing or conflicting military and civil defense objectives.

MISSILE SITES AND FALLOUT HAZARDS

We have in mind, for example, the vexing problem of missile sites, which add to the potential fallout risk of neighboring populations. According to the theory of deterrence, the first targets of enemy attack

⁹³ See 1961 hearings, app. 9A, p. 396.

⁹⁴ 1961 hearings, p. 6.

⁹⁵ Dr. Herbert F. York, then Director of Research and Engineering in the Department of Defense, told the subcommittee in May 1960 "that more lives can be saved in the face of a nuclear attack by a fallout shelter program than by an equal number of dollars worth of active defense system of the Zeus type." "Organization and Management of Missile Programs," hearings before a subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 86th Cong., 2d sess., May 1960, p. 18.

J. P. Ruina, Assistant Director for Research and Engineering, cited an estimate of \$15 billion for 100 or more batteries of Nike-Zeus deployed about major cities and bases in the United States. *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

would be the Strategic Air Command bomber bases and missile sites. These "megaton magnets," particularly if located upwind of cities and other populated areas, would intensify greatly the fallout hazard.

Most of the 230 programmed Atlas-Titan ICBM sites are located west of the Mississippi River. While the heavily populated cities of the East would face no significant fallout threat from an attack on missile sites, some of these sites are not well located from the standpoint of minimizing the risk to local populations. Dr. James E. McDonald, of the University of Arizona, has examined in detail the hazards posed by the Titan missile "ring" around Tucson.⁹⁶

The Air Force rejoinder is that Dr. McDonald's paper "treats only with a narrow aspect of the ICBM siting problem, within only one community area and with only one factor of the many site selection criteria, to the exclusion of other important considerations." It points out that most ICBM sites are located at least 18 nautical miles from communities of 25,000 or more population.⁹⁷

The committee examined the missile-siting problem in its 1960 hearings and report on civil defense. It noted that missile sites generally were organized around existing Air Force bomber bases.⁹⁸

Responsibility for developing site selection criteria was fixed in the Department of the Air Force by a 1955 directive of Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson. While the Air Force insisted strongly that the fallout hazard was an important factor in site selection, the Department of Defense now acknowledges that it was never a controlling one and suggests that the 1955 policy ranked economy ahead of civilian protection in the location of missile sites.⁹⁹

Representatives of the Secretary's office assured the committee that Secretary McNamara recognizes the importance of this problem, has expressed personal concern about it, and is determined to find out what can be done about it at this stage of missile siting developments. A memorandum of July 31, 1961 from Secretary McNamara to the Secretaries of the military departments states:¹⁰⁰

It is the policy of the Department of Defense that missile sites shall not be located in such a relationship to populated areas that an enemy attack on the sites would subject the population to an avoidable fallout hazard.

Exceptions, if any, are to be approved in writing both by the head of the military department and the Secretary of Defense (or his Deputy).

Although the committee regrets that this important decision has come after major site locations have been determined, still it underscores the need to integrate civil defense with strategic military planning, and we expect that corrective action will be taken wherever possible in the missile siting program. It demonstrates also that the Secretary of Defense, if he so wills, can take action within the domain of his Department which the OCDM Director, looking at the problem from the outside, could not very well direct.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ 1961 hearings, app. 13, p. 518.

⁹⁷ 1961 hearings, p. 99.

⁹⁸ H. Rept. 2069, 86th Cong., 2d sess., p. 43.

⁹⁹ 1961 hearings, p. 97.

¹⁰⁰ 1961 hearings, p. 98.

¹⁰¹ See H. Rept. 2069, 86th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 41-42.

USE OF MILITARY RESOURCES AND RESERVES

Civil defense planning and operations in the Department of Defense will have to take account of the Department's large material resources, its technical skills, the procurement experience of its component organizations, and the availability of military reserves.

The use of military reserve forces and components for civil defense purposes has been frequently debated, considered and recommended.¹⁰² In this context, civil defense is associated mainly with postattack emergency operations such as fire and traffic control, rescue work and maintenance of law and order. Many persons believe that the Reserve Forces, if specially trained for civil defense missions, would be performing more useful defense tasks than they do now and would provide a large reservoir of trained and disciplined manpower for postattack emergency operations.

Army planning

In an earlier report we examined the military roles, doctrines and assumptions relative to civil defense.¹⁰³ Traditionally military forces have been called upon, from time to time, to cope with emergencies in aid of civil authorities. The possibility or likelihood that such assistance in large scale would be demanded in a postattack emergency has figured more or less explicitly in Army planning.

The Army recognized on the one hand that the civil organization responsible for civil defense during the decade of the 1950's was largely ineffective; the Army was concerned on the other hand that the demand for military manpower and resources in support of civil defense would interfere with assigned military missions. This basic dilemma has not yet been fully resolved.

If we trace the concept of the military support role in civil defense through Army regulations, we find a gradually changing emphasis. In 1949, the first formal Army regulation on civil defense declared that assistance to civil defense would be given only when this could be done "without jeopardy" to the Army's "primary mission."¹⁰⁴ A year later it was stated that civil defense assistance would be given "with minimum practical diversion" from the Army's primary mission.¹⁰⁵

Department of Defense policy: 1956

By 1956 the matter came under Department of Defense review. The military services were directed to assist civil defense authorities with planning and training. This was to be considered "complementary," not as a substitute for civilian participation in civil defense. At the same time assistance to civil defense was declared to be "an emergency task within the mission" of all military units. The Army was given primary responsibility for coordinating military assistance to civil authorities in emergencies.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² For example, a task force under the chairmanship of Senator Stuart Symington, established Sept. 14, 1960, included in its report to Senator Kennedy a recommendation that a unified command be put in charge of the National Guard and reserve elements of all the military services, with civil defense as one of its responsibilities.

¹⁰³ H. Rept. No. 2946, 84th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 59-72.

¹⁰⁴ Army Special Regulation No. 580-10-1, Aug. 30, 1949.

¹⁰⁵ Revised Special Regulation No. 580-10-1, June 20, 1950.

¹⁰⁶ "Responsibilities for Civil Defense and other Domestic Emergencies," Department of Defense Directive No. 3025.1, July 14, 1956.

Army policy in a 1957 regulation stressed the "temporary" nature of military assistance to civil defense. It said that Army support would be given for a "limited period," and that Army resources would be used only so long as this temporary civil defense need "out-weighs" the need for their use in direct support of "other military operations."¹⁰⁷

Department of Defense policy: 1960

In 1960 the military services again were enjoined to support civil authorities in a civil defense emergency "when military requirements will permit," but this support role was termed a "responsibility within the mission" of all military units instead of an "emergency task."

The Army now concedes that civil defense is, for it, a responsibility "second only to combat operations."¹⁰⁸ Whatever the precise meaning of this new formulation, the Army recognizes that all units in the United States may be used for civil defense support. It goes on the assumption, however, that a separate civil defense organization in the Army is not to be created, and that civil defense responsibilities will be handled by a civilian organization outside the defense establishment. With the vesting of civil defense responsibilities in the Secretary of Defense, new adjustments will have to be made.

Precommitment problem

The issue in large part is one of "precommitment." As we noted in reviewing the Defense General Counsel's report of alternatives for field organization (sec. II), military commanders are confronted with difficult planning problems if they do not know which forces or units will be designated for postattack civil defense purposes.

As the situation stands now, the Department of Defense recognizes that active and reserve forces would be available for emergency recovery missions in case of a nuclear attack, but it has not specifically designated such forces for a civil defense role. The Army prefers that designation of specific Army units to civil defense functions be made after an attack, so that combat requirements first can be determined.¹⁰⁹

Since Secretary McNamara has taken the position that preparation for civil defense assistance should not "downgrade or detract from the combat readiness of Active and Reserve Forces," no active-duty and Ready Reserve combatant forces are considered available for full-time civil defense missions.

Availability of Standby and Retired Reserves

The Standby Reserves are considered to be in a somewhat different position. As backup to the Ready Reserves, under current plans the largest part of these forces would not be expected to be called to duty in the first 2 or 3 months of war. The Secretary's office has stated to the committee:

A major portion of the Standby Reserve would, therefore, presumably be available for civil defense assignment immediately upon the outbreak of war without detriment to current military plans.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ Army Regulation No. 500-70, Apr. 26, 1957.

¹⁰⁸ Revised Army Regulation No. 500-70, Sept. 9, 1960.

¹⁰⁹ 1961 hearings, p. 25.

¹¹⁰ 1961 hearings, p. 25.

The Retired Reserve, consisting of reservists who have completed their military obligation, 90 percent of whom are officers, also are considered available for civil defense missions. While the Department of Defense, at the time of the hearings, had made no detailed legal and administrative analysis of Reserve forces for civil defense roles, its preliminary opinion was that the substantial resources of the Standby and Retired reservists could be used in civil defense programs.

The Department pointed out, however, that new legislation would be required in order to form simple organizations and conduct elementary training, other than on a voluntary basis, prior to a surprise attack.¹¹¹

In view of the rather complex legislative and administrative problems relating to the use of Reserve forces for civil defense purposes, the subcommittee believes that this whole matter should be reviewed in the Department of Defense and that the Secretary should submit recommendations, if necessary, for legislative action.

RESEARCH AND INFORMATION PROGRAMS

One of the great needs, in preparing for an expanded civil defense program, is research on a broad front. The Department of Defense has earmarked \$13.5 million for this purpose, although useful information will be derived from collateral programs, including the national survey.

The committee believes that the level of research effort in civil defense should be increased at least tenfold. Money invested for research and development in the early stages of the program will yield big dividends later in time and money savings.

The efforts of the various agencies, public and private, performing civil defense research with Federal funds, must be better coordinated. A technical review group in the Department of Defense should be made responsible, under the Assistant Secretary for Civil Defense, for screening technical ideas and suggestions, and for defining priority areas of research.

A wide range of problems will have to be covered. Many of these were pointed out in the testimony. Some will deal more immediately with shelter planning and operations, others with medical and biological problems of radiation and other weapon effects. Economic recuperation after a thermonuclear attack and long-range effects on the physical and biological environment will have to be studied. Many new fields of investigation will be opened up.

Research needs in civil defense, the committee must emphasize, should not be formulated so as to delay urgent protective measures. Although there are many unknowns in this whole field, a great deal of basic information is available and enough is known to move ahead with a national shelter program.

An informed public is essential to an effective civil defense program. Millions of pieces of printed matter have been distributed, and various media of communications have been utilized in purveying civil defense information. However, a great deal of this information is

¹¹¹ 1961 hearings, p. 26.

out of date, unrealistic, or partial in its coverage. The public is more confused than it is informed.

Special efforts will have to be made to convey to the public in graphic and understandable terms the kinds of information people need for self-protection.

The public must gain confidence, based on scientific fact, that survival is possible. The myth must be dispelled, nurtured by some persons who ought to know better, that radioactivity after a thermonuclear attack would be so intense for so long a time as to make life on earth intolerable or impossible.

American families will have to be schooled in a wide variety of technical matters relating to radioactivity such as shielding, decay rates, and dose limits. The responsible civil defense authorities should endeavor, to the greatest extent possible, to translate technical information into practical instruction. For example, rather than merely urge people to avoid radioactivity as much as possible, they should formulate a radiation dose schedule indicating how much exposure is possible or permissible during successive phases of emergency and recovery operations.

VII. BASIC ATTITUDES TOWARD CIVIL DEFENSE

From our studies of civil defense over a period of years and testimony taken at our recent hearings we are convinced that, despite the most savage nuclear attack that the enemy can deliver in the foreseeable future, this Nation can survive—if it prepares itself. It can recover. It can restore a viable economy. It can preserve free institutions. It can reestablish high standards of living.

This is not wishful thinking or naive optimism. We have made a careful assessment of civil defense problems and what can be achieved by intelligent, well-planned protective measures.

We never have minimized the immense difficulties of the civil defense job, the large costs involved, or the heavy toll in lives and property that an enemy attack would take despite the best preparations we could devise.

TWO JUSTIFICATIONS

Civil defense finds its justification in two fundamental considerations: (1) It helps to deter attack; (2) it reduces the casualties if deterrence fails and the attack is launched.

We discussed the deterrent value of civil defense in our commentary on President Kennedy's May 25 message (sec. I). Deterrence is a dynamic concept, elusive and difficult to follow in the complex interactions of powerful forces opposing each other. Civil defense is not the primary deterrent. An effective civil defense would not, by itself, dissuade an enemy from attacking the United States. Specific situations are conceivable in which, as Herman Kahn suggests, civil defense could weaken deterrence.¹¹² The broader, more inclusive, range of possibilities makes civil defense a factor in deterrent strength.

Given its reciprocal uncertainties, deterrence may fail, and civil defense finds ultimate justification in its lifesaving potentials. To drive the point home, Mr. Kahn puts the case for civil defense in this blunt way: "It is better to have 20 million dead than 40 million dead."¹¹³

To many people, Mr. Kahn observes, this an unpleasant and even revolting proposition. They would prefer to live in a world which does not pose such grim choices. And yet they have to concede, when the proposition is turned around, that "40 million dead is worse than 20 million dead."

Civil defense is concerned with such broad-value propositions, derived from quantity estimates of casualties that would result from different attack patterns and different kinds of protective measures.

It makes a difference—a large difference—in the casualty estimates if we assume that the attack is made on an unprotected, unprepared population. Even the simplest protective measures would have an

¹¹² 1961 hearings, p. 191.
¹¹³ 1961 hearings, p. 171.

important lifesaving effect. Shielding of the proper sort would reduce the casualty estimates to low percentages.¹¹⁴ Casualties amounting to even 5 percent of the total population would mean 10 million people dead, a tragedy of appalling dimensions. Still, the Nation as a whole would be vastly better off if it prepared itself to withstand the staggering shock of enemy attack.

Thus civil defense offers promise that many can be saved, even if not all can be saved. It offers promise that the body politic and economic can be kept alive and repaired, even if important parts are maimed and broken.

Many people, even some who are well informed and scientifically trained, indulge in wishful thinking that thermonuclear war is impossible, or refuse even to think about it, or throw up their hands in despair. Responsible Government officials, elected or appointed, civilian or military, cannot wish away the problems.

How to survive a thermonuclear war, how to tie up the Nation's grievous wounds and restore its normal life, are tasks of the most difficult and complicated kind. To plan for executing these tasks requires imagination and insight and new knowledge of many kinds. And beyond knowledge—for certain knowledge is gained only by the actual experience of thermonuclear war—it demands faith that the American people have the will and the determination to survive, confidence that the national economy has the resiliency to spring back after the impact of heavy blows.

We know that not everyone has this faith or shares our convictions that civil defense is vitally important and urgent. If one tries to sort out the basic attitudes toward civil defense, he finds a wide spectrum of beliefs conditioned by different emotions, values, and degrees of understanding of the problem. We cannot attempt here to catalog and analyze all of these attitudes, but it is instructive to look at a few. Attitudes are important in shaping public and official response to the President's call for a civil defense program which will demand increasing Government effort, money outlays, and public participation in the years immediately ahead.

ATTITUDES OF REJECTION

The simple bond of pacifist sentiment ties together a bundle of attitudes which reject civil defense as part of the military apparatus. We respect and do not ignore this sentiment, recognizing that its well-springs are a hatred of war and a yearning for peace. Our Nation has need and room for people of such persuasion. Unfortunately, the world in which we live is kept in peace by military strength and preparedness, not by pacific sentiment. Those who are temperamentally opposed to military armament are, along with the rest of us, the beneficiaries of the peace it maintains, however shaky and uncertain.

Reinforcing religious and philosophical attitudes which reject civil defense because it is part of the defense effort, are popular notions about nuclear weapon effects. These notions are part of the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The carnage was so frightful that many

¹¹⁴ 1961 hearings, pp. 211 ff.

preached, and the public came to believe, that civilization would be doomed by atomic war. This belief grew as the weapon stockpiles grew, and as the destructive power of individual weapons multiplied. Nuclear war, from this point of view, is "unthinkable" and civil defense a futile gesture. "There is no place to hide."

THE FUTILITY SCHOOL

There are variants on the futility outlook. Civil defense is futile to some because it cannot promise to save all. It is futile to others because it cannot save enough. The pessimism, understandably, is self-oriented. Individual survival seems hopeless, so the whole Nation will go down.

The implicit supposition of the futility school is that every conceivable target will be hit in the worst possible attack, that the enemy's striking power is unlimited and unfailing in every respect. This supposition is warranted neither by the facts nor the probabilities, but analysis of war strategies, of targeting problems, of aiming errors and weapon effects, is beyond the reach or interest of most people.

Even if civil defense assured that many would survive, say others, the environment after the war would be so "hostile" in persistent radioactivity and other dread conditions that life, in the Hobbesian phrase, would be "poor, nasty, brutish and short." The world would be a wasteland, impossible to rebuild, too poisoned to seed and cultivate. The survivors would struggle against hopeless odds. Their offspring would be deformed and disease ridden. All would live out their brief span in misery and suffering. "The survivors will envy the dead."¹¹⁵

Expert testimony presented at the hearings does not justify these dire prognostications. Life in the postwar world would be hard and grim, the environment would be hostile in many ways, but the forces for recuperation would be strong. Informed judgments, or at least intelligent guesses, can be made about the problems, timing, and degree of rehabilitation and recovery.¹¹⁶

THE "TOO EFFECTIVE" ARGUMENT

Across the way from those who regard civil defense as an exercise in futility are those who fear that civil defense can be too effective, or at least made to look too effective. Then it might work to instill confidence, whether false or true, that thermonuclear war is manageable and that it can be fought and survived. Military men, gaining a reprieve from history, might start a war on their own, or execute a military coup, lobbying in the meantime for more and bigger weapons.

In some formulations of this position, the scientists are put in a devil's partnership with the military, having deserted the halls of learning and quiet research for a career in the science of killing people. The military-scientific "elite," in this view, are supported

¹¹⁵ 1961 hearings, p. 171.

¹¹⁶ See particularly the testimony of Herman Kahn and the RAND Corp. analysts in the 1961 hearings.

by an economy which is overly dependent on military work, but dare not disengage itself because of the potential disruption and unemployment.¹¹⁷

Civil defense—the argument continues—works toward persuading the people that they can survive a thermonuclear war. So long as people persist in believing that nuclear war will not bring on total destruction, the danger of such war and destruction grows. "Thinking makes it so."

Civil defense shelters, from this viewpoint, could save millions of lives, but a national shelter program is to be scorned. It makes people doubt that nuclear war is "obsolete." More and better civil defense only magnifies the potential weight of enemy attack, and the growing threat in turn compels people to dig deeper holes in the ground. This vicious cycle of enemy threat and civil defense counteraction ends up in making us a society of "human moles."

Tracts which pose this "nuclear dilemma" are not generally self-consistent in their arguments. They rail against war. They call it obsolete. They don't want to be suffocated by the Russians; yet they ask us to believe that the country would be better off if we had fewer weapons rather than more weapons, and that we are diverting too much in the way of scientific talent and resources to national defense.

They don't really tell us how to get out of the dilemma which they pose. Presumably they expect that both sides in the world conflict will listen to the voice of reason, sit down and counsel together, and agree to disarm.

What happens if the Soviets are unyielding? A few would go so far as to urge unilateral disarmament on our part. In this way, they arrive at the position, stated in the vernacular, "It's better to be Red than dead."

POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTIONS

Arms control is a quest that our Government must pursue as a matter of national policy. An influential segment of opinion, official and otherwise, opposes a civil defense program as a move which might interfere with arms control negotiations and which might make the Russians doubtful of our sincerity. Sometimes the argument reaches even further. A civil defense program might make the Russians so suspicious that they will become alerted, even "trigger happy" and "accident prone," so that an attack might be launched inadvertently. Worse yet, they might be disposed to strike in "anticipatory retaliation," or what has been termed "striking second, first."

This kind of argument, Mr. Kahn observes, has attributes of the "self-fulfilling prophecy."¹¹⁸ Fearful of a Russian attack, we initiate a civil defense program. This makes the Russians fearful of us. They take counteractions. The end result could be war or violence stabilized at high levels.

¹¹⁷ See, for example, "Community of Fear," by Harrison Brown and James Real, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, Calif., copyrighted by the Fund for the Republic, Inc., September 1960.

¹¹⁸ 1961 hearings, p. 180.

In the dynamics of deterrence, such possibilities cannot be ruled out. The facts of contemporary life make more credible, however, a "self-defeating prophecy." That is to say, military strength and preparedness are more likely to keep the peace than to beget war. Deterrence depends on strength, not weakness.

Furthermore, civil defense is entirely consistent with arms control. The prospect of being both disarmed and without civil defense would be very uncomfortable. Agreements, we have learned, can be broken.

As far as civil defense is concerned, we do not believe that measures to protect the civil population have an "aggressive" mien. The Russians have an active program of civil defense, as we note in the following section (VIII). And for our Nation, which would never strike the first blow, civil defense is the greater imperative.

VIII. SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

The first comprehensive review of Soviet civil defense to appear in public print is contained in the committee's 1959 report entitled "Civil Defense in Western Europe and the Soviet Union."¹¹⁹ This study of Soviet civil defense was prepared by Russian affairs specialists of the Library of Congress on the basis of Russian documentary materials and other information available in the United States.

In view of the considerable interest in this subject, we decided to update our 1959 report with an analytical summary of more recent developments in Soviet civil defense. For this testimony we called upon a RAND Corp. analyst, Leon Gouré, who has studied the Russian source material intensively, has examined reports of travelers, and has made personal observations during a month's tour of the U.S.S.R., including visits to nine Soviet cities.¹²⁰ It was made clear that Mr. Gouré would testify in his personal capacity and not as a staff member of the RAND Corp., which is under contract to the Department of the Air Force and which also sponsors other studies.

The following commentary is our own, based largely on Mr. Gouré's testimony, with references, where appropriate, to our previous report.

NO OUTWARD SIGNS

First of all, we may note a disposition in some quarters to discount the Soviet civil defense effort, leaving an implication that if the Soviets are not worried about civil defense, neither should we in the United States be worried.

There was, for example, a recent newspaper article in the New York Times, datelined Moscow, which reported "no outward signs of even the most elementary preparations for civil defense against nuclear blasts or fallout."¹²¹ No practice alerts were observed in Moscow. Posters on factory bulletin boards relating to civil defense were said to be rare. Foreign military experts attached to embassies in Moscow reportedly saw no evidence of shelter construction work. The New York Times writer concluded that if key Soviet officials had deep shelter refuges marked out for themselves in case of emergency, this was a "dark secret."

The committee does not doubt that public evidence of civil defense preparation in the Soviet Union is scanty, particularly to the untrained observer. Soviet civil defense does not depend on exhorting the public through mass media of communication. Articles on civil defense do not appear in the leading newspapers such as Pravda, Izvestia, and Red Star.

¹¹⁹ H. Rept. No. 300, 86th Cong., 1st sess.

¹²⁰ Mr. Gouré's testimony commences at p. 263 of the 1961 hearings.

¹²¹ Article by Osgood Caruthers, datelined Moscow, July 8, and reported in the New York Times, July 16, 1961. See a rebuttal letter by Leon Gouré published in letters to the editor, New York Times, July 23, 1961.

Reports on local civil defense activities, however, appear almost daily in specialized newspapers and magazines. Civil defense handbooks and manuals, numbering almost 100, have been published in hundreds of thousands of copies and translated into most of the languages spoken in the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, the civil defense program, so far as training of the Soviet population is concerned, is compulsory. The people are not persuaded, they are ordered. And civil defense is not a new kind of Government-directed activity to excite great comment, for Soviet citizens were inured to civil defense in World War II. Their homeland was attacked and invaded. Casualties to the military and civilian population possibly exceeded 20 million. While certain features of the training programs and physical preparations of the past have been made obsolete by developing military technology, the Soviets have a large foundation of experience, discipline, and hardware upon which to base their present programs.

Even if Soviet efforts in the civil defense field were considerably less than ours, we would have cause to be concerned. As we noted in section I of this report, civil defense weighs in the strategic balance, and the would-be aggressor has the large advantage. He can order his people to be sheltered or evacuated and to make other preparations in advance of attack. Warning time to his own people is ample—of his own making.

The strategic headstart in civil defense which any aggressor has, makes it less important for him to institute crash construction programs, with a great deal of public noise and clamor, or to effect visible preparatory actions of the kind which the casual observer would take as a measure of the civil defense effort. The Soviets do not find it necessary, for example, to mark shelters, nor even to stock many of them with food. These things can be done quickly, after an alert. More important are the basic protective means and facilities, and these the Soviets have in considerably larger measure than do we in the United States.

AN EXPANDING PROGRAM

Admittedly the information is fragmentary, but it comes from many sources and it adds up to this informed judgment: " * * * for the past 10 years or so the Soviet Union has been engaged in an extensive and expanding civil defense program." This is Mr. Gouré's conclusion, and the testimony, together with the committee's 1959 findings, amply supports it.

The Soviet civil defense program is not "a paper program"; it is not merely an extension of earlier civil defense activities; it is not a crash effort with a readiness target date. Instead, as Mr. Gouré observes, the Soviet civil defense program, within given limits of budget and resources, makes steady progress and takes account of new developments in weapon technology.

We do not have to strain our credulity to assume an active Soviet interest in civil defense. Their military might grows, and they believe it is an increasingly effective deterrent, as their many bold and crude threats suggest. Nevertheless, the Soviets do not rule out the possibility of war. Indeed their people are brought up to believe that

"warmongering capitalist circles" are a constant threat of war. We, in turn, condemn Soviet threats and aggressive moves. The possibilities of conflict are ever present.

If war should come, the Soviets assume that nuclear, and even chemical and bacteriological weapons would be used; that their city people, industries, and political and administrative centers would be made targets, as well as their military and strategic bases.

Soviet military chiefs look upon civil defense as an integral part of their defense capability and as directly contributing to their war readiness. Their civil defense program emphasizes protection of the economy and population against attacks with nuclear, as well as chemical and bacteriological weapons; training of the population to reduce casualties and to provide manpower for postattack operations; and techniques for limiting damage and hastening recuperation from attack.

ORGANIZATION AND BUDGET

At the time the committee's 1959 report was published, the Soviet civil defense organization was headed by an administration and staff within the Ministry for Internal Affairs of the U.S.S.R. This Ministry was abolished in 1960. The administrative position of the top civil defense organization is not quite clear. Mr. Gouré said it may have been transferred to the Ministry of Defense because civil and military organizations are closely tied together.

The Soviet civil defense network reaches down through the republics, provinces, counties, cities and boroughs to individual factories, public buildings, large apartment houses, and collective farms. Typical civil defense organizations for a local unit are outlined in organization charts presented in the subcommittee hearings. There are permanent full-time staffs at the various levels of government, and part-time but fully trained civil defense services and units at all levels.

The size of the Soviet civil defense organization has not been publicly stated, although Soviet Premier Khrushchev has boasted to foreign visitors that there are 22 million fully trained persons serving in civil defense and that the organization is being expanded. This figure would represent about 10 percent of the Soviet population and would approach the basic Soviet requirement for a ratio of 1 civil defense unit of approximately 48 persons to every 500 inhabitants.

Whether or not Mr. Khrushchev's figures are exaggerated, recruiting is compulsory and announced goals are attainable.

Soviet authorities have published no information on the size of the civil defense budget. Many parts of it are hidden in budgets of other agencies and local administrations.

One estimate was presented to the House Committee on Appropriations by OCDM Director Ellis. He put the range of expenditures between \$500 million and \$1.5 billion. Mr. Gouré estimates that in the past decade the Soviet Union has spent at least \$3 billion and possibly much more on civil defense.

TRAINING PROGRAMS

Compulsory training of the Soviet population is central in Soviet civil defense. Soviet military leaders stress that training of the population will minimize trauma and panic, prevent many casualties, facilitate self-help and collective emergency measures after an attack, and thereby serve to strengthen the defense capability of the Soviet Union.

Our 1959 report noted that extensive formal training programs for protection against atomic weapons were begun in 1954, with new programs added in 1955 and 1958. Early objectives called for the entire adult population to have completed at least one 10-hour course by the end of 1956. The Soviets claimed that 85 percent of their people completed this course.

The 1958 addition to the civil defense training program included a 20-hour compulsory course, practical training for adults, and special training for schoolchildren. Our 1959 report stated:

The scope and intensity of this mass training probably means that more people have learned the fundamentals of civil defense in the Soviet Union than in any other country.¹²²

A new 18-hour course was added in 1960, to be completed in 1962. This course treats more realistically the problems of dealing with the effects of thermonuclear weapons, particularly fallout, than did any of the previous courses.

Based on the best available information, it is now estimated that between 50 and 100 million Soviet citizens have taken part in formal civil defense training courses, and that expenditures for training alone now amount to between \$100 and \$200 million annually, exclusive of the time of students and instructors, which is given free.

The training program is handled by the DOSAAF (Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy), which is a large paramilitary organization.

Training takes place in small study circles organized at places of work or residence. Little use of mass propaganda media is involved.

INDIVIDUAL MEANS OF PROTECTION

Soviet citizens are instructed in individual means of protection against chemical and bacteriological agents and against inhalation or direct body contact with radioactive matter. The use of protective clothing, masks, and individual decontamination packets figures heavily in the training program. Some 30 million masks, of good quality, have been issued to civil defense personnel and are made available to others for training purposes. Additional masks are to be distributed to the population when the Government believes war to be imminent.

Protective clothing made of rubberized or plastic material is distributed only to civil defense personnel. The general population has been directed to provide its own or to improvise protective clothing in an emergency.

¹²² H. Rept. 300, 86th Cong., 1st sess., p. 42.

Individual decontamination packets, used extensively in the training courses, are designed for removal of liquid vesicants from skin and clothing. More advanced types contain inhalants. The Soviet people are now being trained in the proper use of atropine syrettes against nerve gases and of other antidotes against other chemical agents. Presumably these antidotes will be included in the individual decontamination packets.

REDUCING URBAN VULNERABILITY

As we reported in 1959, civil defense considerations have influenced markedly urban planning in the Soviet Union since 1940. There has been a continuing effort to reduce the population density of cities, to create barriers against the spread of fires, to relocate some industry, and to improve transportation for emergency evacuation purposes.

These efforts proceed in the context of growing urbanization of the Soviet population. It is estimated that of the 212 million inhabitants of the Soviet Union, about one-half live in cities. About 70 percent of the entire population resides west of the Ural Mountains. One-fourth of the population is concentrated in 155 major cities.

Big cities are now being limited in size. Construction of new factories in these cities is being held down. Satellite towns are being built 30 to 50 miles distant from the major cities. Moscow has 14 satellite towns and Leningrad 6. Population density is being reduced in the design of new housing districts, and firebreaks are being created through the use of 300-foot-wide streets and extensive belts of greenery. Little is known about the relocation and dispersal of Soviet industry.

SOVIET SHELTER PROGRAMS

Shelter construction is important in Soviet civil defense. We reported in 1959 that this program emphasizes public shelters as opposed to private or family-type shelters. It comprises the construction in peacetime of permanent shelters in the cities, to be supplemented in emergencies by simple fallout shelters quickly built or improvised in the rural areas.

All permanent shelters provide varying degrees of protection against blast and complete protection against collapsing buildings, radiation, and fire, as well as chemical and bacteriological agents. They are designed for relatively long term occupancy. According to the testimony, they are provided with water, toilets, filter ventilation units, hermetically sealing steel doors edged with rubber, and with lighting, heating, bunks, storage batteries, and possibly, in some cases, bottled oxygen. Food is stored in some but not all types of shelters.

Shelter types are classified as follows:

(1) Very deep or heavy shelters designed to survive quite near the point of a nuclear explosion. These include deep underground tunnels, hillside tunnels, and bunker-type shelters. They are designed to withstand at least 300 pounds per square inch and are equipped for long-term occupancy. It is assumed that select civil defense, military, governmental, and party personnel will have first call on these shelters.

(2) Detached shelters, completely or partly underground, designed to withstand blast pressures of 100 to 150 pounds per square inch.

They may have space for from 150 to several thousand persons and also are equipped for long-term occupancy. They are to be used as industrial, public, and elite shelters.

(3) The subways have been officially designated as shelters, and it is believed that they have been adapted for this purpose. Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev have subway systems. The stations and platforms in most instances are more than 100 feet deep. Indications are that sealing or blast doors are concealed at the entrances to station platforms. The present Moscow subway is 43 to 45 miles long. Probably 1 to 2 million persons could be sheltered in the lower stations and tunnels. This would represent about 20 to 40 percent of the city's population. During the present 7-year plan the Moscow subway is to be expanded by about 35 miles.

(4) Basement shelters are special structures built into apartment houses or public buildings and designed to protect people against some blast as well as against radiation, fire, collapsed buildings and debris, chemical and bacteriological agents. The Soviet basement shelter is completely below ground level. It has a reinforced concrete roof supported by steel or reinforced concrete beams capable of withstanding at least the collapse of the building above. Depending on the design and materials used, blast protection is in the range of 10 to 100 p.s.i. Recommended capacity of such shelters is 100 to 150 persons, but may be larger.

Basement shelters have double airtight steel doors edged with rubber. They are equipped with necessary heating, sanitation, and other equipment. A standard filter ventilation unit is hand- or electrically-operated and capable of filtering out radioactive dust as well as chemical and bacteriological agents. Emergency exits are provided, and there is some interconnection between basement shelters in adjoining buildings.

The basement shelters do not have stored foods, but people seeking cover would be expected to carry their own foods.

(5) Simple fallout shelters, in large numbers, would be built after a "threatening situation" alert. These would include earth-covered trenches, dugouts, or galleries in hillsides, using whatever materials are handy, and covered by 3 feet of earth. Except for the dugouts, these shelters are not designed for long-term occupancy. They are built for 25 to 100 persons. It is expected that a simple shelter can be built in 24 hours at presurveyed sites. Civil defense personnel are trained in the speedy tracing and laying out of such shelters.

On the basis of the available information, it appears that the Soviet Union has built shelters to protect a substantial part, though by no

means all, of city residents. Given sufficient warning time to build emergency fallout shelters, the Soviet authorities probably could provide shelter for a majority of the population.

EVACUATION PLANS

Our earlier report noted that in 1958 the Soviet civil defense authorities began to show an interest in urban evacuation. These plans have been developed within the past year or two. They are supervised by borough and city evacuation committees working in cooperation with the civil defense transportation and other services.

If a "threatening situation" alert is sounded, the Government intends to evacuate a substantial number of urban residents. Those ordered to leave will assemble at predesignated points within 2 or 3 hours and will be moved by all available means of transportation, first to initial staging areas 10 to 50 miles from the cities, and later, if time permits, to permanent quarters in small towns and rural areas. The evacuation will be tightly controlled at all stages.

Soviet transportation facilities are progressively expanding and presumably will be used in any evacuation. Large-scale evacuation exercises have not been carried out. Moscow has numerous exits by road, rail, and water.

OTHER MEASURES

The Soviets have developed and distributed a great variety of instruments for detecting radiological and chemical hazards, and equipment for mobile medical treatment, firefighting, and decontamination. People are trained in the use of such equipment, but radiation meters are to be issued only to civil defense personnel. Since most people will be in public shelters, under the supervision of civil defense shelter teams, individual meters are not considered necessary. Where shelter stay time is limited, as in apartment house basement shelters, people will be evacuated through partly decontaminated passages to nearby radiation-free areas.

To reduce postattack casualties, limit damage, and quickly restore production facilities, there are plans to carry out large-scale rescue, firefighting, and decontamination operations in disaster areas.

In concluding his testimony, Mr. Gouré observed the available evidence leaves no doubt about the serious nature of Soviet civil defense planning. He noted some obsolete or even irrational features, which may be due to budgetary and technical limitations or to bureaucratic inertia. However, constant efforts are being made to improve the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense and its ability to deal with new threats.

LIST OF WITNESSES

Member of Congress:

Hon. William E. Minshall.

Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization :

Hon. Frank B. Ellis, Director.

Charles A. Kendall, General Counsel.

Carey Brewer, Executive Assistant to the Director.

John F. Devaney, Director of Systems Analysis.

Eugene Quindlen, Deputy Assistant Director for Federal-State Local Plans.

Department of Defense :

Hon. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense.

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Cyrus R. Vance, General Counsel.

Adam Yarmolinsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary.

Maj. Albert K. Stebbins, III, Defense Atomic Support Agency.

Rogers Cannell, Consultant.

Department of the Navy :

Captain Eli B. Roth, Commanding Officer, U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory.

Walmer E. Strope, Associate Scientific Director, U.S. Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory.

Atomic Energy Commission :

Dr. Charles L. Dunham, Director, Division of Biology and Medicine.

R. L. Corsbie, Deputy Assistant Director for Civil Effects.

Hudson Institute :

Herman Kahn.

RAND Corporation :

Leon Gouré.

Norman A. Hanunian.

Dr. Jerald E. Hill.

H. H. Mitchell, M.D.

Sidney G. Winter, Jr.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. CLARE E. HOFFMAN

If the destructive effect of today's, and possibly tomorrow's, weapons is anywhere near as great as we are advised, there is some doubt that shelters will save more than a small proportion of the population. But perhaps an all-out effort to save that small percentage is well worth our effort.

It is hoped that the frightening effect of the President's statement and the statements of others—some in the civil defense organization—will not throw fearful people into the clutches of unscrupulous, money-mad individuals or organizations, who, under the pretense of saving the lives of some members of the family, will sell worthless so-called shelters at an exorbitant price.

CLARE E. HOFFMAN.

**ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. CLARE E. HOFFMAN, HON.
GEORGE MEADER, HON. CLARENCE J. BROWN, HON.
ODIN LANGEN, AND HON. JOHN B. ANDERSON**

While this report is primarily an analysis of the history, status, and plans for civil defense, it also has the effect of promoting the subcommittee's pet project—a nationwide program for the construction of underground group shelters at Federal expense (report, pp. 58, 59).

The committee looks upon the civil defense program announced to date "as a beginning and we assume that it is but a first step in a well-organized, progressively developing civil defense program" (report, p. 6). The report then goes on to state that "The Department of Defense must develop, as rapidly as possible, an optimum shelter plan for the United States." The cost of one such plan is estimated at \$20 billion (report, p. 58).

The undersigned do not in any way wish to minimize the need for civil defense and agree with the committee's recommendation that the Department of Defense should develop an optimum shelter plan for the United States.

However, the need for expenditures of the magnitude of \$20 billion should be determined in the light of all strategic factors and should be weighed against alternate requirements for defense expenditures.

The subcommittee's suggested example of an optimum shelter plan to partially protect against the effects of known and existing weapons was first proposed in 1956 and may be ineffective against new or greater weapon hazards.

The majority report on page 5 reads as follows:

We find it heartening and fortunate that the President recognized the vital importance of an effective civil defense. His personal messages to the Congress and to the American people have banished, almost overnight, a great deal of public apathy and indifference.

The following comments on this passage seem appropriate:

1. Whether public apathy and indifference have been banished is clearly a matter of opinion, and the majority report cites not one shred of evidence to support such a conclusion.

2. Whether the banishing or diminishing of public apathy and indifference to civil defense to the extent that it has been diminished is ascribable to a speech of the President is likewise a matter of pure conjecture. We suggest that the recent resumption of nuclear testing by the Soviets and the pollution of the atmosphere, together with the worsening of the international situation and the threatening attitude of Mr. Khrushchev may have had more to do with any change of attitude on the part of the American public than Presidential oratory.

3. As recently as Saturday, September 16, 1961, top officials of the Kennedy administration have been reported as being apathetic to home shelters.

It is reported, reliably we believe, that of 14 high officials who sit with Mr. Kennedy on the National Security Council or in the Cabinet, not a single one has as yet built a home shelter.

Vice President Johnson recently bought a French chateau type home in Spring Valley which is being revamped, and the revamping does not include a fallout shelter according to his aids.

Secretary of State Rusk and his wife have been talking about a shelter but have made no decisions.

Apparently Secretary of Defense McNamara is now arranging to have a shelter installed in the big house he rents on Kalorama Circle to set an example since he is in charge of civil defense.

Frank B. Ellis, civil defense director, is renting a house and is trying to get a shelter so designed that it can be removed if the next tenant does not want it.

Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of the Treasury Dillon, Attorney General Kennedy, Secretary of Agriculture Freeman have no shelters.

Secretary of Commerce Hodges lives in an apartment and can't have a shelter of his own.

Secretary of Labor Goldberg contemplates no shelter either for his home in Washington or his home in Chicago.

Secretary of Welfare Ribicoff rents a house in Georgetown and feels that he can't do anything about a shelter.

The only high official who seems to be really shelter conscious is Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatric. He has a shelter both at his Long Island home and his home at Grasonville on Maryland's Eastern Shore.

Apparently, if the President's speech has banished public apathy and indifference to civil defense, it fell on deaf ears in his own official family.

CLARE E. HOFFMAN.

GEORGE MEADER.

CLARENCE J. BROWN.

ODIN LANGEN.

JOHN B. ANDERSON.

